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I. INTRODUCTION: UNVEILING THE CORPORATE LAW  
MYTHS EMBEDDED IN CITIZENS UNITED 
From derivative suits to the derivative speech rights of 
corporations recognized in Citizens United v. FEC,1 the watershed 
2010 Supreme Court opinion that overturned restrictions on corporate 
political speech in the form of independent expenditures, our law 
takes inconsistent stances on how, for whose benefit, on whose behalf 
corporations speak. The Citizens United opinion, which wrestled with 
the boundaries of fundamental First Amendment rights and the extent 
to which free speech protections should be extended to corporations, 
is riddled with assumptions about corporations that are often divorced 
from the economic and legal realities in which these entities exist. 
This Article employs traditional corporate law principles (e.g. 
fiduciary duties, corporate governance and securities regulations) to 
challenge the foundational assumptions regarding corporate entities 
that the Court relied on in concluding that corporate speech should be 
treated the same as individual speech.  
Corporate personhood is central to the determination of 
corporations’ claim to First Amendment free speech rights. Courts 
struggle to appropriately define, or, more accurately, conceptualize 
corporations for the purpose of extending or denying constitutional 
rights. The evolution of corporate personhood, culminating in 
Citizens United, can be juxtaposed with the development of corporate 
law in areas such as derivative suits, the proxy process, and SEC 
regulations, which recognize the complexity of corporate speech.2 
                                                                                                                 
1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
2 See Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive 
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The conceptualization of corporate speech in Citizens United—how it 
is created, the ends that it serves, and the protection it should 
receive—is inconsistent with conceptualizations of the corporate form 
and a corporate “voice” in other areas of the law.  
Examining the Supreme Court’s conceptualization of corporate 
political speech in Citizens United reveals flaws in the Court’s 
assumptions about how corporations speak that do not comport with 
traditional corporate law principles. These flaws highlight the 
differences between corporate and individual speech. A 
conceptualization of corporate political speech that is grounded in 
traditional corporate law principles challenges the assumptions 
underlying the Court’s conclusion that corporate political speech 
cannot be distinguished from individual speech and therefore may not 
be regulated by Congress.3  
The Citizens United Court ignored the following five realities of 
corporate political speech: (1) corporate speech, even when political, 
has an economic motivation; (2) there is no singular corporate voice; 
(3) unrestricted corporate political speech poses a risk of compelled 
speech; (4) corporate speech is already regulated based solely on the 
identity of the corporate speaker; and (5) corporate law, in the form of 
securities regulations, employs the equalization rationale.  
This Article juxtaposes corporate law’s conceptualization and 
regulation of corporate speech with the approach advanced in Citizens 
United, and asks whether corporate law can help inform the 
fundamental First Amendment debate regarding corporate political 
speech. The answer appears to be yes because viewing the Citizens 
United opinion through a corporate law lens reveals the five 
fundamentally flawed assumptions listed above. The second Part of 
this Article explores the historical development of corporate 
constitutional rights, including the constitutional conceptualization of 
                                                                                                                 
 
Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 
169, 181–83 (2004) (analyzing the different entity theories used by legal scholars and the courts 
to conceptualize the corporation as a single entity); see also Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the 
Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
199, 202 n.7 (2010) (describing the different pieces of a corporation that, when put together, 
form a cohesive picture).  
3 In addition to invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b, Citizens United also reversed the 
prohibition on unions from making independent campaign expenditures. This Article focuses 
exclusively on the corporate law issues raised in the case and does not address the separate, but 
related, issue of labor unions.  
Additionally, qualifying nonprofit corporations organized under 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3) 
and 527, as well as corporations qualifying for the MCFL exemption, were exempted from the 
prohibitions on corporate campaign expenditures under § 441b and are therefore outside of the 
scope of the Citizens United holding and the issues addressed in this Article. See FEC v. Mass. 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (establishing the MCFL exemption). 
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corporations and the fundamental assumptions shaping the Court’s 
view of corporate speech in Citizens United. The third Part analyzes 
the majority opinion, identifying the conceptualization of 
corporations it employs and the assumptions upon which it relies. 
Finally, the fourth Part of this Article debunks the flawed corporate 
law assumptions buttressing the Court’s conclusion that corporate 
political speech is indistinguishable from individual speech.  
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:  
THE ROAD TO CITIZENS UNITED 
Citizens United v. FEC overturned the long legal history of 
regulating corporate political speech—from the Tillman Act of 19074 
to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.5 Initially unable to 
reach a majority decision, the Supreme Court requested a rare 
reargument of the case and revived a facial challenge to 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b.6 In the five-to-four opinion, the Court overturned § 441b’s 
restriction on corporate independent expenditures and thus overruled 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,7 a major decision 
                                                                                                                 
4 Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) 
(banning “any corporation whatever” from making “a money contribution in connection with” 
federal elections). 
5 Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 
U.S.C.) (addressing the increased role of so-called “soft money” in campaign financing and the 
proliferation of issue-advocacy advertisements); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate 
Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach 
32–34 (Feb. 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474421 
(discussing the evolution of campaign finance laws from the Tillman Act and through the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act). See generally Kimberly Demarchi, Election Campaign 
Funding After Citizens United, 46 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 20 (2010) (providing a historical background 
of election contributions). 
The Tillman Act was passed in response to President Theodore Roosevelt’s first State of 
the Union Address calling for an absolute ban on contributions by corporations for any political 
purpose, 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905), after allegations arose that his campaign for election had 
accepted substantial corporate contributions. MARK GROSSMAN, POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCANDALS, POWER, AND GREED 271 (2003). 
6 Adam Liptak, Case Could Overhaul Rules on Campaign Spending, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 2009, at A12. Justice Stevens’ dissent highlights that Citizens United expressly abandoned 
its facial challenge in its motion for summary judgment in the district court. Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Brief for Plaintiff, Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-2240) 
(opposing FEC’s motion for summary judgment and supporting its own motion for summary 
judgment). See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (prohibiting national banks, corporations, and labor 
organizations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with certain elections); 2 
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a)(i) (defining the term “electioneering communication”); Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit 
advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to 
broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a 
general election.”).  
7 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
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upholding corporate campaign expenditure restrictions.8 The thrust of 
the Court’s argument was that independent expenditures—those made 
by corporations and labor unions that are not coordinated with a 
candidate or the candidate’s committee or party—do not raise 
corruption concerns and therefore do not meet the strict scrutiny 
threshold necessary to restrict speech otherwise protected by the First 
Amendment.9 
A. Evolving Constitutional Conceptualizations of Corporations 
The Court’s evolving treatment of corporations has depended in 
part on its view of them—the sources of their rights and their role in 
society—and certain assumptions regarding how corporations 
function. As those views have evolved, so too have the constitutional 
protections afforded to corporations, including rights under the First 
Amendment. In Citizens United and other corporate political speech 
cases, the Court’s conceptualization of and assumptions about 
corporations shape the outcomes. This Article identifies the 
conceptualizations relied upon by the Court and deconstructs their 
underlying assumptions.  
The Supreme Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward10 articulated the artificial entity theory—the original 
constitutional conceptualization of corporations—by stating, “A 
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
existence.”11 Under this view, corporations were routinely denied 
constitutional protections.12 
This rigid artificial entity theory softened into a second approach 
that focused on corporations as possessing the aggregate rights of 
                                                                                                                 
8 Citizens United also overruled parts of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which 
extended § 441b’s restrictions on corporate election expenditures. 
9 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (“[W]e now conclude that independent 
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”). Earlier, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court had 
reasoned that uncoordinated expenditures undermine the value of such speech to the candidate 
and therefore decrease the threat of quid pro quo reciprocation from the candidate or elected 
official. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.  
10 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).  
11 Id. at 636. 
12 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 99 (1872) (Field, J., 
dissenting) (“But the court answered, that corporations were not citizens within the meaning of 
this clause; that the term citizens as there used applied only to natural persons, members of the 
body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature and 
possessing only the attributes which the legislature had prescribed . . . .”).  
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their shareholder-owners. “Viewed as a group of individuals or as a 
real and discrete entity with attributes similar to those of a person, a 
corporation gains First Amendment rights that are indistinguishable 
from those of individuals.”13 This approach is often used in 
connection with the argument that corporate political speech should 
receive full First Amendment protection because it protects the rights 
of the citizen-shareholders14 to speak through the corporation.15 
This second, “aggregation approach” gave way to a third, more 
aggressive and individualistic conceptualization of corporations, 
which declared them autonomous and separate from both their 
originating states’ laws and their shareholders.16 The evolving 
                                                                                                                 
13 Berger, supra note 2, at 182. 
14 This article uses the phrase “citizen-shareholder” to discuss the questions of corporate 
political participation raised in Citizens United because the case implicates the participatory 
rights of citizens as well as their economic interests as shareholders. The comprehensive 
category of shareholders of publically traded companies in the United States certainly includes 
other groups such as non-citizen shareholders (i.e., those living and working here with a visa or 
a green card) as well as foreign nationals who neither live nor work in this country. 
15 See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant at 13–17, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-
205), 2009 WL 693638 (arguing that nonprofit corporation speech is funded mostly by 
individuals); Brief of the American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
Citizens United at 12–14, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 132718 
(arguing that Citizens United is comprised of individual donors); Brief of American Justice 
Partnership and Let Freedom Ring as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2359479 (“To be heard effectively, individuals 
with less financial wherewithal must pool their resources. If they seek to do so by forming a 
corporation, Austin permits them to be silenced rather than heard.”); Brief of Fidelis Center for 
Law and Policy and Catholicvote.Com as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner on Supplemental 
Question at 9, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365209 (“Austin 
endorsed what must be seen as an unconstitutional condition because the benefits of 
incorporating now come at a price, i.e., shareholders are not free to use their corporate treasury 
to fund political speech about candidates.”); Brief of National Rifle Ass’n as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 147861 
(arguing that First Amendment protects actions of individual donors acting in concert); Brief of 
Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner on Supplemental Question at 
16, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2349017 (“[C]orporations provide 
‘individuals the ability to organize in a form that would allow them to engage efficiently in 
collective action.’” (quoting Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, 
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1111 (2002))); see also 
Larry Ribstein, Corporate Speech Is About Real People Speech, IDEOBLOG (Mar. 13, 2010, 3:26 
PM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/citzens-united (“Citizens United is about the speech 
rights of real people acting through associations. If you take away the speech rights of people 
acting through associations, you have to decide which other types of associations you want to 
apply that to. Unincorporated firms? The ACLU?”); cf. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential 
Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1009 (1998) (“Several 
theories of the corporation have been used to support the classification of the corporation on the 
private, nongovernmental, individual side of the great liberal divide between state and civil 
society. The oldest theory—conventionally referred to as the ‘aggregate’ theory—deemed the 
corporation to be ‘really’ just its ‘members’ and, accordingly, entitled to the same protection the 
‘members’ would have.”). 
16 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 580–81 (1990) (“[T]he ‘natural entity’ or person theory . . . regards the 
corporation not as artificial, but as real, with a separate existence and independent rights. It is 
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conceptualization of corporations has facilitated, in part, the trend to 
extend constitutional protections to such entities.17 Today, 
corporations enjoy the protection of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.18 
The Citizens United opinion affirmed, in part, that corporations 
enjoy First Amendment protections. Corporations, however, are not 
mentioned in the Constitution; thus, the extension of such rights 
depends on case law. Corporations, originally viewed as mere 
creatures of state law with limited rights and powers (the artificial 
entity theory), were routinely denied constitutional rights early in the 
nineteenth century.19 For example, in the Slaughter-House Cases,20 
the Supreme Court differentiated the rights of “naturalized” citizens 
from those of corporations, which were state-created entities and 
outside of the intended scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.21 The court held  
                                                                                                                 
 
associated with continental theorists who, at the turn of the century, wrote about ‘group’ or 
‘corporate’ personality in an effort to challenge individualism and to come to terms with 
institutions of modern society such as corporations, trade unions, universities, and professional 
associations. This understanding of the corporation most favors corporate constitutional rights.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
17 See LEE DRUTMAN & CHARLIE CRAY, THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS: CONTROLLING 
CORPORATIONS AND RESTORING DEMOCRACY 44–45 (2004) (discussing a corporation’s legal 
status and constitutional protections). 
18 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (applying the 
Fifth Amendment protection from double jeopardy to corporations); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (“[T]he act imposing the tax in question is unconstitutional under the 
due process of law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press . . . .”); Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“We are also of opinion that an order for the production of books and 
papers [of a corporation] may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth 
Amendment.”); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) 
(“It is now settled that corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional 
provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws.”); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 
(1889) (extending Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process to corporations); Bank of 
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91–92 (1809) (establishing the right for a 
corporation to bring an action in its own name); United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 
1350 (D. Colo. 1984) (“The guarantees of the Sixth Amendment apply to corporate defendants 
with the same force as to individual defendants.” (citing United States v. Rad-O-Lite of 
Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979))), rev’d on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1456 
(10th Cir. 1987). 
19 Mayer, supra note 16, at 579–80. 
20 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
21 [T]he court held, that a corporation, being a grant of special privileges to the 
corporators, had no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where 
created, and that the recognition of its existence by other States, and the 
enforcement of its contracts made therein, depended purely upon the assent of those 
States, which could be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States 
might think proper to impose. 
. . . The common privileges and immunities which of right belong to all citizens, 
stand on a very different footing [from that of a corporation].  
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that corporations were not citizens within the meaning of [the 
Fourteenth Amendment]; that the term citizens as there used 
applied only to natural persons, members of the body politic 
owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created 
by the legislature and possessing only the attributes which the 
legislature had prescribed . . . .”22  
The expanded conceptualization of a corporation as a legal person 
that enjoys a nearly full panoply of rights began in 1886 with Santa 
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.23 In retrospect the 
extension of constitutional rights to corporations was a sea-change 
moment. It was accomplished, however, through a preargument 
statement of Chief Justice Waite that was included in the court 
reporter’s footnote to the oral-argument transcript.24 Since the Santa 
Clara decision, the constitutional rights of corporations have been 
recognized in several areas, particularly under the Bill of Rights.25 
Corporations are entitled to freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment, protection from unreasonable searches under the Fourth 
Amendment, freedom from double jeopardy under the Fifth 
Amendment, counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and jury trials in 
civil cases under the Seventh Amendment.26 
                                                                                                                 
 
Id. at 100 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 80. 
22 Id. at 99. 
23 118 U.S. 394 (1886). At issue in Santa Clara County was whether California was 
prohibited under the Due Process Clause from taxing a railroad company’s property differently 
from that of an individual.  
24 One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for 
defendants in error was that “Corporations are persons within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Before argument 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it 
does. 
 
Id. at 396.  
25 See Mayer, supra note 16, at 582 (“As late as 1960 the corporation arguably enjoyed 
only the protection of the fifth amendment’s due process clause. Today, the corporation boasts a 
panoply of Bill of Rights protections . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Corporations first received Bill 
of Rights guarantees in 1893. In Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165 
(1893), a railroad corporation invoked the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to challenge 
the Secretary of the Interior’s revocation of an approval for a right-of-way over federal public 
lands. The Court invalidated this action, viewing it as an attempt to deprive the railroad 
corporation of its property without due process. Id. at 176. “Although the Court in Noble did not 
explain why the fifth amendment due process clause—as opposed to the fourteenth amendment 
clause—should apply to corporations, no other interpretation is possible, because the defendant 
was the federal government.” Mayer, supra note 16, at 591. 
26 Berger, supra note 2, at 182 (“Corporations count as persons for the Fourth 
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The initial denial of constitutional protections to corporations, as 
well as the later extension of such protections, depended on the 
Court’s conceptualization of corporations under corporate personhood 
theories. In the 125 years since Santa Clara, the law’s view of 
corporations in terms of legal philosophy has evolved so that 
corporations are now considered either an aggregation of their 
members, entitled to the aggregate rights of those members, or as an 
entirely separate, free-standing entity entitled to constitutional and 
other rights as legal persons.27 The majority in Citizens United 
employed both the aggregation-of-rights and entity theory of 
corporations to reach its conclusion that corporate political speech is 
to be treated the same an individual political speech. 
Even though the law has reached a tentative consensus that 
corporations, as legal persons, have some rights, the law still deals 
with corporations in a cumbersome and often inconsistent way. In 
some areas, the law makes no distinction between the individual and 
                                                                                                                 
 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
against double jeopardy, and the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury in civil cases.”); 
Mayer, supra note 16, at 578 (“The corporation’s invocation of the first ten amendments 
symbolizes the transformation of our constitutional system from one of individual freedoms to 
one of organizational prerogatives.”). Corporations, however, are not entitled to the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection from self-incrimination. “[C]orporations, unlike individuals, can be 
required to testify against themselves and have no right of privacy.” KENT R. MIDDLETON & 
WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 288 (8th ed. 2011) (footnote omitted); 
see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that search of petitioner’s offices 
for business records did not offend Fifth Amendment); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 
21 (1974) (holding that record-keeping and reporting requirements imposed on bank by Bank 
Secrecy Act did not deprive bank of due process); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 
632 (1950) (holding that due process is not violated if inquiry is not too indefinite and 
information sought is relevant). 
For a discussion of Fifth Amendment protections (life, liberty, property) claimed by 
corporations for regulatory takings, such as the recent case in which the Second Circuit held that 
a Massachusetts law requiring the disclosure of tobacco ingredients constituted a regulatory 
taking of the trade secret, see DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 17, at 58–61.  
For a discussion of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to corporations, see U.S. v. 
Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 549–50 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that corporations have a right to 
counsel but no right to appointed counsel should they be unable to afford to cost of retaining 
counsel) and U.S. v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that corporations cannot be subject to interrogation outside the presence of counsel 
after initiation of criminal proceedings). 
27 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be 
denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”). But 
cf. id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In the context of election to 
public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although 
they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it.”); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 53–60, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 
6325467 (discussing the interests of the corporate shareholder versus the corporation’s 
individual interests). 
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the corporation; yet in other circumstances, different treatment is 
warranted by their apparent differences in structure, function, and role 
in society. For example, tax treatment including the deduction of 
expenses and the levels of taxation (“double” for corporations), issues 
of criminal punishment, and the application of the commercial speech 
doctrine primarily to corporate speech are but a few examples of the 
unique treatment that corporations receive under the law.28 In 
delineating the legal distinctions between corporate and individual 
actors, the issue of speech from the corporate entity has long occupied 
the Supreme Court and tested the rational limits of First Amendment 
doctrines.  
B. Constitutional Recognition of Corporate Political Voices 
Before Citizens United, corporations were prohibited from making 
direct candidate contributions and, for a certain time period before 
primary and general elections, independent expenditures.29 Section 
441b, which was struck down in part in Citizens United,30 made it 
“unlawful for any . . . corporation organized by authority of any law 
of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with 
any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary 
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for 
any political office.”31 Contributions and expenditures include 
electioneering communications32 or their functional equivalent.33 
                                                                                                                 
28 See, e.g., 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4946 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2010) (“Even if it is accepted that a 
corporation has the capacity to commit a particular crime, it cannot be indicted if the 
punishment prescribed for the crime cannot be imposed upon a corporation. A corporation, 
therefore, cannot be indicted for a felony where the only punishment provided is death or 
imprisonment, since a corporation cannot be subject to either penalty.”); Herwig J. Schlunk, A 
Minimalist Approach to Corporate Income Taxation, 59 SMU L. REV. 785 (2006) (discussing 
the double-taxation method applied to corporations). 
29 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010). 
30 The ban on direct contributions by corporations in § 441b was not a part of the 
constitutional challenge in Citizens United and remains good law. See Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. at 901 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, which upheld limits on direct contributions to 
candidates). 
31 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). 
32 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). This provision reads: 
 
For purposes of this section and section 79l(h) of title 15, the term 
“contribution or expenditure” includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms 
are defined in section 431 of this title, and also includes any direct or indirect 
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or 
anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in 
accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary 
course of business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or 
organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this 
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Electioneering communications means communications that are 
publicly distributed and the term includes “any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication”34 that clearly identifies a federal election 
candidate within sixty days of a general or thirty days of a primary 
election.35 
Even though corporations were restricted from making 
independent expenditures before Citizens United,36 corporations still 
had avenues available to them through which they could participate in 
political speech. These avenues included: (1) contributions to political 
action committees (PACs), (2) expenditures on direct lobbying 
efforts, and (3) utilizing corporate funds to encourage employees to 
support or oppose a particular candidate or issue.37 Additionally, 
                                                                                                                 
 
section or for any applicable electioneering communication, but shall not include 
(A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or 
administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members 
and their families on any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote 
campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative 
personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and 
their families; and (C) the establishment, administration, and solicitation of 
contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a 
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or 
corporation without capital stock.  
 
Id. 
33 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003). 
34 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (2010). 
35 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (“The term ‘electioneering communication’ 
means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which—(I) refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within (aa) 60 days before a general, special or runoff 
election for the office sought by the candidate or (bb) 30 days before a primary . . . to nominate 
a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication 
which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the 
relevant electorate.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“Thus, the following acts 
would all be felonies under § 441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 
days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who 
favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging the 
public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; 
and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a 
Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech.”). 
36 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), Pub. L. 107–155, 
116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.) (addressing the 
increased role of soft money in campaign financing and the proliferation of issue-advocacy 
advertisements).  
Under § 441b, corporations were prohibited from “using general treasury funds to make 
direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain 
qualified federal elections.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
37 See MIDDLETON & LEE, supra note 26, at 302 (“Profit-making corporations . . . may 
support PACs and engage in partisan communication—including advocating the election of 
specific candidates—provided the communications are directed only to the corporate . . . 
‘family.’ A corporation may use corporate funds to urge management, shareholders, and their 
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§ 441b contained exemptions for media corporations38 and for 
communications “by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political 
organization . . . if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds 
provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or 
nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”39 Thus, 
corporations had access to the political marketplace and a voice in the 
debate, although that voice was restricted. 
In applying the First Amendment to corporations, four cases are 
essential to understand the constitutional trajectory of the corporate 
political speech doctrine prior to Citizens United:40 Buckley v. 
Valeo,41 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,42 FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,43 and Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.44 Emerging from these cases, are the key 
                                                                                                                 
 
families to vote for a specific candidate . . . .”).  
38 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B) (“The term ‘expenditure’ does not include—(i) any news 
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, 
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or 
controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate . . . .”).  
39 Id. § 441b(c)(2). Nonprofit corporations that were formed solely to promote political 
ideas, that did not collect funds from for-profit corporations, and that did not engage in business 
activities were also exempted from the restrictions on corporate expenditures under § 441b. FEC 
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986). 
40 A great deal of constitutional scholarship has been devoted to these cases and is not the 
intended focus of this Article. Please note that there are several key First Amendment decisions 
that are not included in this discussion. This Article is an attempt to infuse the First Amendment 
debate with corporate law principles, not to conduct a survey of free speech cases. For a more 
detailed discussion of the First Amendment case law leading up to Citizens United, see Michael 
S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010). 
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley established the distinction between restricting direct 
contributions and indirect expenditures. The Court concluded that regulation was justified 
because direct contributions could create quid pro quo relationships between donors and 
recipient; the Court was also worried about the mere appearance of such corruption. Id. at 26–
27. Restrictions on expenditures, on the other hand, failed to survive strict scrutiny and were 
struck down. Id. at 54.  
42 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the Court again confronted campaign restrictions, this 
time in the context of a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited corporations from making 
expenditures for ballot measures not related to their interests. Id. at 768. The statute contained a 
presumption that income-tax measures were not related to the interests of corporations and 
therefore corporations were prohibited from making expenditures related to tax issues on the 
ballot. Id. The Court addressed whether speech by corporations had any less First Amendment 
protection than the speech of natural persons and determined, at least with respect to direct 
ballot issues, that there was no constitutional provision to support the distinction. Id. at 784–86. 
43 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
44 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
Austin upheld § 441b’s restrictions on independent corporate campaign expenditures, finding 
that the regulation was narrowly tailored because it was not an outright ban on expenditures by 
corporations, but merely a regulation on how they might be used. Id. at 659–60. 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
876, was an extension of Austin. The Court upheld restrictions preventing corporations and 
labor unions from using their general treasuries to make electioneering communications. Id. at 
203–09. 
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First Amendment metaphors and arguments regarding the 
constitutional role of corporate political speech that framed the debate 
in Citizens United.  
In Buckley and Bellotti, the Court thwarted attempts to restrict 
corporate political speech on the grounds that (1) speech is money; 
(2) corporations contribute to the political marketplace of ideas;  
(3) there is no special threat of distortion or need to equalize 
individual and corporate voices; (4) corporate political speech 
implicates freedom of association rights; and (5) concerns of 
compelled shareholder speech do not justify restricting corporate 
political speech. In subsequent cases such as Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life (“MCFL”) and Austin, however, the Court utilized some of 
these same arguments to explain or validate certain restrictions on 
corporate political speech. Later, in Citizens United, however, the 
Court employed the same lines of reasoning advanced in the cases 
discussed below, to equalize corporate and individual speech thus 
expanding corporate First Amendment rights. The Court’s application 
of these common arguments—as either an attack against or support 
for corporate political speech restrictions—depends on both the 
Court’s constitutional conceptualization of corporations and its 
assumptions about the roles, rights, and responsibilities of 
corporations in our economic and legal society. 
1. The Foundation: Spending Money Is a Protected Form of Speech 
The determination that spending money in campaigns—through 
either contributions or expenditures—is a form of constitutionally 
protected speech or expression is a cornerstone in the First 
Amendment debate regarding corporate political speech rights.45 In 
Buckley, which upheld direct-campaign-contribution caps but struck 
down similar restrictions on expenditures, the Court found for the 
appellants, who argued that “limiting the use of money for political 
purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the 
First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political 
communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of 
money.”46 Because corporations can speak only through a conduit—
either a representative of the corporation or, even more indirectly, 
through spending money—the recognition that money is a form of 
speech is an essential element in recognizing First Amendment 
protection of corporate political speech.47  
                                                                                                                 
45 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 See Berger, supra note 2. That a corporation cannot speak directly but must speak 
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2. The Marketplace of Ideas: A Shifting Metaphor to Both Extend and 
Restrict Corporate Political Speech Rights 
Second, in debating the political speech rights of corporations, the 
Court has frequently employed the metaphor that the First 
Amendment protects a marketplace of ideas.48 In Bellotti, the Court 
struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting corporate political 
speech regarding ballot measures not related to the corporation’s 
interests.49 Rather than making a determination about the independent 
right of corporations to engage in political speech, the Court utilized a 
marketplace-of-ideas justification to overturn the prohibition in 
question. The Court reasoned that the First Amendment protects the 
“stock of information from which members of the public may 
draw,”50 and concluded that all speech benefits the citizen-recipients. 
The Court refused to discount the contributions of speech from 
corporations, asserting:  
“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.” If the speakers here were 
not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could 
silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech 
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is 
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation 
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in 
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union, or individual.51 
                                                                                                                 
 
through a representative or use an indirect form of speech is represented by the ventriloquist 
metaphor. This imagery is not entirely accurate, however, because a corporation is even further 
removed from the speech than the ventriloquist speaking through a dummy. The corporation as 
an entity does not control its own speech. Rather, the board of directors of the corporation 
controls the speech. To be even more accurate, the board of directors would be the ultimate 
puppet master pulling the strings of the ventriloquist who is speaking through the dummy. A 
possible exception may be single-shareholder corporations, where the voice of the corporation is 
the voice of the sole shareholder. 
48 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257; First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
49 See supra note 42 (discussing Belotti). 
50 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. The Court analogized corporate political speech to corporate 
commercial speech. Id. at 766. Commercial speech—speech related to a commercial 
transaction—is protected under the Constitution but receives only intermediate scrutiny. See, 
e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770–73 
(1976) (discussing how commercial speech can be regulated). 
51 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77 (second alternation in original) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
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In MCFL, the Court once again employed the marketplace-of-ideas 
metaphor in analyzing the constitutional protections afforded to 
corporate political speech when it exempted a nonprofit, nonstock 
corporation from complying with the restrictions on corporate 
expenditures contained in § 441b.52 The MCFL Court, however, used 
the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor as a general justification to restrict 
corporate speech, not as a means to strike down the regulation for the 
benefit of the citizen-listeners as it had in past cases.53 The Court 
described the rationale of § 441b as 
the need to restrict “the influence of political war chests 
funneled through the corporate form” . . . . 
This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated 
corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to 
protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas. It 
acknowledges the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ observation 
that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”54  
In exempting MCFL, the Court concluded that restricting the political 
speech of this particular type of corporation did not serve the goals of 
§ 441b, such as preserving the representative capacity of the 
marketplace of political ideas as a barometer of public support for a 
particular candidate or idea.55 In MCFL, the Court implied that 
citizen-listeners have an interest not only in accessing different ideas 
within the political marketplace, but also in preserving the 
representative capacity of the marketplace so that the volume of such 
speech bears some relationship to public support for it.56  
                                                                                                                 
52 In this case, the Court declined to extend the restrictions in § 441b to MCFL. The Court 
concluded that the restrictions in § 441b were too “burdensome” where the rationales for the 
restrictions were found to be largely inapplicable to a nonprofit, nonstock corporation that was 
engaged in issue advocacy and received no corporate donations. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241–42. 
53 Id. at 257. 
54 Id. (second omission in original) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting)); see also Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 
(1972) (discussing how Congress sought to prevent union treasuries from influencing federal 
elections); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am., 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957) (discussing how Congress sought to reduce the political 
influence of those with a large amount of capital).  
55 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258. 
56 See id. at 257 (concluding that corporate spending would not let the marketplace of 
ideas function as an accurate indicator of public opinion). 
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3. Limited Expenditures as a Means to Equalize Voices and Prevent 
Overamplification of Corporate Voices 
Related to the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor are the equalization-
of-voices and antidistortion rationales alluded to by the Court in 
MCFL. The equalization-of-voices and antidistortion rationales are 
also key components of the Court’s analysis of corporate political 
speech rights. The Court in Austin upheld restrictions on corporate 
independent campaign expenditures,57 allowing a different standard to 
be applied to corporate—as opposed to individual—political speech 
because the corporate structure provided unique advantages that 
might allow corporations to overpower the political voice of the 
individual. The Court thus validated the antidistortion rationale in 
Austin.58  
Decades before Austin and MCFL, however, the Buckley Court 
considered and rejected the equalization rationale—which advocates 
limiting expenditures to level the political playing field. The Court 
stated that the expenditure limits served “to mute the voices of 
affluent persons and groups in the election process . . . to equalize the 
relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections.”59 
The Court concluded that restricting “the quantity of campaign speech 
by individuals, groups, and candidates” struck “at the core of our 
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”60 Following 
Buckley, the Court in Bellotti similarly rejected the equalization and 
antidistortion rationales as being unsupported by the record.61 Instead 
                                                                                                                 
57 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
58 Id. at 660 (“[T]he unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the 
amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth 
can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, 
just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.”). 
59 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1976). 
60 Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).  
61 In Bellotti, next in the progression of corporate political-speech cases, the Court 
followed Buckley’s reasoning, stating: 
 
Appellee advances a number of arguments in support of his view that these 
interests are endangered by corporate participation in discussion of a referendum 
issue. They hinge upon the assumption that such participation would exert an undue 
influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and—in the end—destroy the 
confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of government. 
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may 
drown out other points of view. 
 
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978); see also id. at 789–90 (rejecting the 
equalization and antidistortion rationales on the ground that there was “no showing that the 
relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing 
referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in 
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of rejecting the rationales wholesale, the Court emphasized the lack of 
a record justifying the restriction. Alerted to the need to develop a 
record regarding distortion harms to support expenditure limits, 
Congress did so in passing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.62 
Those restrictions were subsequently recognized as valid in MCFL 
and Austin.63 
Thus, the equalization-of-voices and antidistortion rationales, 
initially rejected in Buckley and Bellotti, were subsequently 
recognized as valid justifications for restricting corporate political 
speech in MCFL and Austin. Citizens United, discussed further in Part 
III, abandoned the reasoning of MCFL and Austin and returned to the 
Court’s original position in Buckley and Bellotti by rejecting these 
rationales. Freedom of association, the right of an individual to speak 
through a voluntary association, is a key element of later arguments 
such as those made in Citizens United to protect corporate political 
speech as a means to give full voice their citizen-shareholders. 
Corporate political speech rights are thus viewed as a means to fulfill 
the mandate of the freedom of association clause of the First 
Amendment and is based on the aggregate-rights theory of 
corporations discussed above. 
4. Freedom to Associate as a Justification for Collective Corporate 
Political Speech: An Aggregate Theory View of Corporate Speech 
A fourth theme in the Court’s historical analysis of corporate 
political speech rights is the interplay between freedom of association 
and freedom of speech when citizens speak through their 
organizations, including for-profit corporations.  
In Buckley, the Court raised the notion that spending money in a 
political campaign, whether through a direct contribution or an 
expenditure, also implicates the associational rights of individuals.64 
The Court asserted that capping independent expenditures in 
campaigns burdens freedom of speech because it “precludes most 
associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, 
                                                                                                                 
 
government” (footnote omitted)). 
62 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (“Congress recodified § 610’s corporate and 
union expenditure ban at 2 U.S.C. § 441b four months after Buckley was decided. Section 441b 
is the independent expenditure restriction challenged here.” (citation omitted)); H.R. REP. 107-
131, at 4 (2001) (identifying the disclosure of sponsors of communications as the only 
government interest that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act serves).  
63 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
64 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22–23. 
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the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection 
of the freedom of association.”65 Utilizing an aggregate theory of 
politically active organizations, the Court concluded that restricting 
independent associations’ expenditures of money in political 
campaigns unjustifiably interfered with the constitutional rights of the 
members of those associations.66 
5. The Threat of Compelled Speech: The Shareholder Protection 
Rationale 
The fifth important element in the Court’s constitutional analysis 
of corporate political speech rights is the shareholder protection 
rationale, which argues that corporate political speech should be 
restricted to prevent the threat of compelled speech among a 
heterogeneous group of shareholders. In Bellotti, the Court rejected 
Massachusetts’s justification for its law prohibiting corporate 
participation in ballot measures. Massachusetts had argued that the 
law was justified because it prevented shareholders from being forced 
by economic concerns to give voice to opinions they themselves did 
not hold.67 The Court reasoned that mechanisms of corporate 
democracy, such as shareholder election of the board of directors, 
provided adequate protection against such concerns.68 Ultimately, 
however, the Court rejected the shareholder protection rationale 
because it was both over- and underinclusive—including speech that 
could comport with citizen-shareholder views and excluding other 
types of potentially politically incongruent activity, such as lobbying 
or making independent expenditures on behalf of campaigns.69  
The Court returned to compelled shareholder speech in Austin, 
where it reversed its earlier position on the shareholder protection 
rationale. The Austin Court prohibited general corporate treasuries 
                                                                                                                 
65 Id. at 22. The Buckley Court, however, upheld limits on direct campaign contributions 
because even though they limited the amount of financial support an individual could lend to a 
candidate or committee, they left “the contributor free to become a member of any political 
association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates.” Id.  
66 Id. (“The Act’s constraints on the ability of independent associations and candidate 
campaign organizations to expend resources on political expression ‘is simultaneously an 
interference with the freedom of [their] adherents.’” (alternation in original) (quoting Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion))). 
67 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792–93 (1978). 
68 Id. at 794–95 (“Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of 
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on public issues. 
Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions 
in the corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own 
interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
69 Id. at 793–95. It bears noting that in Citizens United Justice Kennedy rejected the 
shareholder protection rationale, relying on the same over- and underinclusive reasoning 
employed by the Court in Bellotti. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010). 
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from funding political speech that could be inconsistent with the 
views of their citizen-shareholders, recognizing (in dicta) concerns 
regarding compelled speech of shareholders.70  
These five elements of the Court’s historical First Amendment 
analysis of corporate political speech rights—spending money is 
speech; corporate speech influences the marketplace of ideas; 
corporate and individual voices compete; corporate political speech 
implicates the freedom to associate; and corporate political speech 
threatens to compel speech—were all revived in the Citizens United 
opinion and shaped by the Court’s conceptualization of and 
assumptions regarding corporations.  
III. IDENTIFYING THE CORPORATE  
POLITICAL VOICE IN CITIZENS UNITED 
Having examined the different theoretical conceptualizations of 
corporations employed in First Amendment cases leading up to 
Citizens United and the Court’s history of analyzing corporate 
political speech, the next step is to examine the Court’s 
conceptualization of corporations and the theory of a corporate 
political voice employed by the majority in Citizens United. Justice 
Kennedy utilized both the artificial-entity and aggregate-rights 
theories to conceptualize corporations and strike down corporate 
independent expenditure bans.71 The majority ultimately based its 
ruling on the findings that: independent expenditures are 
uncoordinated with the candidate; they pose no threat of corruption or 
the appearance of corruption; and they therefore do not serve the 
government’s purported compelling interest in restricting such 
                                                                                                                 
70 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 673 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (“[T]he Michigan law protects 
dissenting shareholders of business corporations that are members of the Chamber to the extent 
that such shareholders oppose the use of their money, paid as dues to the Chamber out of 
general corporate treasury funds, for political campaigns.” (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260–61 (1986))); cf. id. at 686–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
shareholder of a for-profit corporation should expect the management to take any action that the 
majority wants—as long as it is designed to make a profit—regardless of whether the 
shareholder himself finds it “politically or ideologically uncongenial”). 
Note that there were no shareholders in the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the group 
challenging the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s restriction on corporate independent 
campaign expenditures. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the members of the Chamber of 
Commerce were more like shareholders in a corporation than members in a traditional 
organization. “Although the Chamber also lacks shareholders, many of its members may be 
similarly reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the Chamber’s political 
expression, because they wish to benefit from the Chamber’s nonpolitical programs and to 
establish contacts with other members of the business community.” Id. at 663 (majority 
opinion). 
71 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
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speech.72 In reaching its decision, the Court overturned Austin, which 
had found that the unique threat of corporate political speech 
warranted certain governmental restrictions.73 The holding of Citizens 
United, therefore, was not limited to the issue of direct contributions 
versus indirect expenditures. It extended to the much broader question 
of the proper constitutional treatment of corporate political speech. In 
reaching its decision, the Court drew on the First Amendment 
metaphors and arguments developed in the rich line of corporate 
political speech cases discussed above, and it adopted conflicting 
conceptualizations of corporations in order to craft its conclusion.  
In concluding that the government cannot restrict corporate 
independent expenditures based solely on the corporate identity of the 
speaker, Justice Kennedy relied on the following two 
conceptualizations of the corporation: (1) the voice of a corporation is 
just as valuable to a voter as the voice of an individual which reflects 
the entity theory approach; and (2) corporations are protected 
“associations” of individuals under the First Amendment’s Freedom 
of Association Clause which reflects the aggregation-of-rights theory. 
The Court questioned the distinction between corporate political 
speech and individual political speech, noting, “[s]peech restrictions 
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means 
to control content.”74 This conclusion was framed using the 
marketplace-of-political-ideas metaphor. Citing Buckley and Bellotti, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that the speech of a corporation is no less 
valuable to the voter than the speech of an individual, and that it 
therefore cannot be subject to restrictions.75 “The First Amendment 
does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based 
on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political 
speech.”76 This reasoning returned the corporate political speech 
                                                                                                                 
72 Id. at 910 (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the 
electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political 
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.” (citing Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976))). 
73 Id. at 913.  
74 Id. at 899. 
 
Personhood has been ‘a conclusion, not a question.’ Referring metaphorically 
to the corporation as a person allows the decision-maker to treat the corporation as if 
it were identical for all purposes to individual human beings. Referring 
metaphorically to the marketplace of ideas suggests that the corporation needs 
protection from government regulation because its voice is necessary to the debate 
from which truth will emerge.  
 
Berger, supra note 2, at 186 (footnote omitted). 
75 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912. 
76 Id. at 913. 
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doctrine to its original place by framing the issues in terms of 
Bellotti’s marketplace of political ideas, where the potential value of 
any speech to the citizen-listener prevents restrictions—even on 
corporate speakers.77 Additionally, the Citizens United Court rejected 
the equalization-of-voices and antidistortion rationales—that 
regulation is justified by the risk that corporate voices will drown out 
individual voices—adopted in MCFL and Austin. 
Arguing that “[o]n certain topics corporations may possess 
valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors 
or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates 
and elected officials,”78 the Court disavowed any discount of 
corporate political speech in the marketplace of ideas.79 In reaching 
its conclusion, the Court conceptualized corporations as artificial 
entities that have a right to speak in the political arena independent of 
their members’ right.80 Thus, the Court’s application of the entity 
theory advanced its argument that corporate political speech is 
constitutionally protected.  
The Court concluded, “[t]he purpose and effect of [§ 441b] is to 
prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations, 
from presenting both facts and opinions to the public.”81 The Court 
viewed the expenditure restrictions in § 441b as eroding the 
marketplace of political ideas. The Court opined that Austin and its 
progeny, including the language adopted in the Bipartisan Campaign 
                                                                                                                 
77 See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (“The inherent worth of 
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of 
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”). But see FEC v. Mass. 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive influence of 
concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity 
of the marketplace of political ideas.”). The marketplace-of-political-ideas metaphor has also 
been criticized for protecting speech that serves no democratic function but harms the social 
fabric, and for having an “inevitable bias” that supports the entrenched power structures of 
ideologies. Berger, supra note 2, at 188.  
78 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912. 
79 Cf. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (“We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth 
Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise 
would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its 
source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its 
business or property. The “materially affecting requirement . . . amounts to an impermissible 
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesman may 
represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a 
sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.”).  
80 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1000 (arguing that in collapsing the corporate 
form into the individuals standing behind it, the courts gloss over the important organizational 
distinctions between corporations and individuals in terms of evaluating First Amendment 
rights). For the argument that there should not be First Amendment protections for 
commercially motivated speech because it does not serve the goal of self-expression, see C. 
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 
(1976). 
81 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907. 
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Reform Act, “interfere[] with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas 
protected by the First Amendment. [They] permit[] the Government 
to ban the political speech of millions of associations of citizens. 
Most of these are small corporations without large amounts of 
wealth.”82 In this line of reasoning the Court appeared to adopt some 
of the equalization-of-voices concern underpinning the antidistortion 
argument. But instead of employing it in the context of the individual 
versus a corporation, the Court employed it in the context of large 
versus small corporations. The Court combined historical corporate 
political speech arguments—the marketplace-of-political-ideas and 
equalization rationales—with an entity-theory conceptualization of 
corporations in order to reach its conclusion that corporate political 
expenditures could not be restricted under the First Amendment. 
Demonstrating the Court’s inconsistent view of corporations is its 
simultaneous adoption of the aggregation-of-rights-theory 
conceptualization of corporations in Citizens United. Under this 
theory, corporations possess the aggregate rights of their citizen-
shareholder.83 The Court thus conceptualized corporations as 
associations of citizens, who are unquestionably protected under the 
First Amendment.84 The Court rejected the idea that citizen 
“membership” through stock ownership in a publicly held corporation 
should be treated differently from citizen membership in any other 
type of organization.85 
The constitutional scope of the first amendment includes a 
protection of the right to free association. The government 
cannot prevent free people from joining private organizations. 
                                                                                                                 
82 Id. at 906–07 (citations omitted).  
83 Instead of thinking about corporate functioning, corporate sociology, or corporate law, 
and then considering how constitutional norms designed to protect citizens from the power of 
the state should apply to powerful nonstate organizations, the Court often has seen its task as 
determining whether corporations are “persons” entitled to protection from the state. In general, 
the Court has concluded that they are. See Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1006, 1009 (“Several 
theories of the corporation have been used to support the classification of the corporation on the 
private, nongovernmental, individual side of the great liberal divide between state and civil 
society. The oldest theory—conventionally referred to as the ‘aggregate’ theory—deemed the 
corporation to be ‘really’ just its ‘members’ and, accordingly, entitled to the same protection the 
‘members’ would have.”). 
84 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
85 Cf. Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 288 
(1988) (“Membership in a publicly-held corporation should rest on the same constitutional 
plateau as membership in other organizations.”). 
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Neither can the government enjoin the speech individuals use 
in connection with their right to free association.86  
By categorizing corporations under the same headings as any other 
organization—artistic, political, community based, etc.—the Court set 
the stage to fully protect corporate speech as an extension of the 
rights of the citizen-shareholders standing behind the corporation.87 
“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of 
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under 
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not 
‘natural persons.’”88 By framing the right of corporations to engage in 
political speech as an extension of the association and free speech 
rights of their citizen-shareholders, the Court returned to the 
aggregate theory of corporations and the line of reasoning first 
employed in Buckley and Bellotti. 
Additionally, the Court refused to discount the constitutional status 
of corporations as First Amendment protected associations merely 
because corporations are organized for commercial purposes.89 The 
Court reasoned that corporate “speech cannot be distinguished based 
upon the presence or lack of economic motive. That would eliminate 
most speech from first amendment coverage. Likewise, if one 
eliminates the right to association from economically interested 
groups, one would eliminate most groups, with the possible exception 
of the purest religious groups.”90  
The majority opinion in Citizens United highlighted the Court’s 
inconsistent conceptualization of corporations under the First 
Amendment drawing upon both entity and aggregate views of the 
corporate form. In reaching its conclusion to overturn § 441b’s ban on 
                                                                                                                 
86 Id. at 286–87 (footnotes omitted). 
87 In this imaginary marketplace of ideas, as in Lochner’s imaginary market, all is 
necessarily for the best in this best of all possible worlds, provided only that legislatures are 
barred from interfering on behalf of market losers. Those who win deserve to win. Any attempt 
to legislate different rules that might generate different winners is a violation of secularly sacred 
rules of the game. In short—and particularly since markets operate by the ancient principle that 
to those who have much, much will be given—might makes right. See Greenwood, supra note 
15, at 1017 (describing the shift in First Amendment theory that resulted in understanding it as a 
“Lochnerian enactment of a free market of information”). 
88 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
89 It is important to note that there are nonprofit corporations, single-shareholder 
corporations, and corporations formed solely to serve political ends, which are all excluded from 
the arguments made herein. These subsets of corporations can be dealt with through exemptions 
or exceptions to any campaign-finance law and are therefore largely outside of the scope of this 
Article. 
90 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 287. “If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits 
Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in 
political speech.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
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independent corporate campaign expenditures, the Court employed 
both the entity theory, reasoning that corporate political speech has 
the same value as individual speech in the marketplace of ideas,91 and 
the aggregate-rights theory, reasoning that corporations are protected 
associations.92 The Court’s shifting conceptualization of corporations 
and its flexible application of historical First Amendment arguments 
create an inconsistent doctrine of corporate political speech rights. 
The malleability of the Court’s views of corporations stems from its 
flawed assumptions about the economic, political, and legal realities 
of corporations. 
IV. FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS: INSERTING CORPORATE LAW  
INTO THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEBATE IN CITIZENS UNITED 
Citizens United held that independent expenditures that are not 
coordinated with the candidate pose no threat, or the appearance of a 
threat, of corruption; and therefore there is no constitutionally 
sufficient justification for restricting such expenditures.93 The Court 
discarded any First Amendment distinction based on the corporate 
identity of the speaker reasoning that corporations enjoy the same 
First Amendment protections and rights to participate as individuals. 
The thrust of the majority opinion, however, was built upon flawed 
assumptions regarding the constitutional rights of corporations and 
their role within society and the marketplace of political ideas. 
In evaluating the fundamental First Amendment arguments for and 
against the constitutional protection of corporate political speech, the 
Court engaged in a discussion about corporations and their role in our 
political system without reference to principles of corporate law or 
their ensuing realities. Introducing these fundamental principles into 
the Court’s First Amendment debate reveals the flawed assumptions 
underlying its shifting conceptualization of corporations, which led it 
to conclude that corporate political speech is indistinguishable from 
individual political speech.94 Applying a corporate law perspective to 
                                                                                                                 
91 Id. at 912–13. 
92 Id. at 913. 
93 Id. at 910. 
94 The Court’s assumptions regarding corporations are foundational elements to its ruling 
because  
 
nonlegal factors, far more than legal ones, determine which opportunistic 
claims to First Amendment attention will succeed and which will not. Legal doctrine 
and free speech theory may explain what is protected within the First Amendment’s 
boundaries, but the location of the boundaries themselves—the threshold 
determination of what is a First Amendment case and what is not—is less a doctrinal 
matter than a political, economic, social, and cultural one.  
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the Citizens United debate, five points for discussion emerge: (1) the 
economic motivation of corporate speech, (2) the lack of a single 
corporate voice, (3) the threat of compelled speech, (4) the prevalence 
of existing regulation of corporate speech, and (5) the applicability of 
the equalization rationale to corporate speech. 
A. Economic Motivation of Corporate Speech 
The Court in Citizens United refused to discount corporate 
political speech from individual speech because of the economic 
motivation present in corporate speech. Justice Kennedy wrote, “All 
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed 
from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First 
Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by 
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the 
speaker’s ideas.”95 A traditional corporate law analysis of corporate 
political speech, however, reveals that when corporations “speak” in 
any arena, commercial or political, they do so with an economic 
motivation. Pursuant to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,96 corporations owe 
their shareholders a singular fidelity to maximizing shareholder 
wealth in the form of corporate returns.97  
Corporations have an additional and significantly different set 
of problems: they are legally required to represent not a group 
of people but a legally defined set of interests—the interests 
of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no 
associations, economic incentives or political views other 
than a desire to profit from its connection with this particular 
corporation.98 
                                                                                                                 
 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2004). 
95 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
96 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
97 Id. at 682; see also Wolfson, supra note 85, at 288 (discussing the stock corporation’s 
duty to make a profit for its shareholders). Shareholder wealth maximization as a principle of 
corporate law is a mechanism to align the interests of corporate managers (directors and 
officers) with the interests of the shareholder owners. E.g., Hector Rocha, People, Firms and 
Society: Three Proposals for Aligning Personal Motives, Firm’s Goals and Societal Needs (Nov. 
4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295193; cf. M. Todd 
Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company (The 
Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 373, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070284 (arguing that the shareholder-wealth-
maximization rationale of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is overemphasized and mistaught). 
98 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1033. 
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The economic nature of corporate speech, however, was largely 
ignored in the Court’s analysis of corporate political speech in 
Citizens United. Corporate speech is given no discount for its 
economic motivation and is treated as equal to the speech of an 
individual.99  
The Court discussed the economic influence on corporate speech 
only in the context of the antidistortion rationale of Austin, which the 
Court overturned.100 Relying on Buckley, which “rejected the premise 
that the Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections,’” the 
Court abandoned the antidistortion rationale.101 The Court reasoned 
that all speakers, whether corporations or individuals, amass within 
the economic marketplace the wealth necessary to fund political 
speech. The Court found the unique economic structure of a 
corporation to be irrelevant in determining the scope of First 
Amendment protection for its speech.102 
Citizens United left unexamined questions such as whether the 
economic speech of corporations should be discounted within the 
marketplace of political ideas. How should we reconcile the 
marketplace of commodities within the context of the marketplace of 
the mind? By treating individual and corporate speech equally 
because both “persons” must obtain the necessary funds through 
economic endeavors, the Court glosses over important distinctions 
between the economic nature of corporations as legal persons and that 
of individuals.  
Certainly, from a marketplace-of-ideas perspective, listeners 
benefit from all viewpoints expressed in the marketplace regardless of 
the source.103 Additionally, the line between economic and political 
                                                                                                                 
99 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” (quoting First Nat’l 
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).  
Utilizing the personhood metaphor simplifies the analysis of corporate speech rights 
because it “diverts attention away from the differences among forms of organization and from 
the different treatments that should result.” Berger, supra note 2, at 186–87.  
100 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903–06. 
101 Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)). “Austin found a 
compelling governmental interest in preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” Id. at 903 
(quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
102 Id. at 905. 
103 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (“The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such 
political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 
479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate 
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speech is easily blurred. For example, one can imagine an activist 
writing a politically inspired book; that speech would be considered 
political in nature. Once the book begins earning royalties, or once the 
author begins giving paid talks or readings, however, the speech takes 
on an economic element.104 There is no way to completely eradicate 
the economic speech elements from political speech or vice versa. 
The economic motivations of individual political speech can be 
distinguished from that of a corporation, however, in several 
structural respects. First, corporations have a greater ability to 
accumulate wealth beyond capacities of an individual due to their (1) 
perpetual life span of a corporation, (2) resource-pooling abilities of 
corporations, and (3) special tax rates and tax breaks.105 The majority 
in Citizens United, however, rejected the argument that these 
structural differences warranted different treatment under the First 
Amendment.106 “All speakers, including individuals and the media, 
use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their 
speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it 
was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who 
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”107 
                                                                                                                 
 
wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of 
political ideas.”); cf. Berger, supra note 2, at 188 (arguing that the marketplace-of-ideas 
metaphor includes a bias for existing power and ideological structures within society); Stanley 
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1984) (asserting 
that the theoretical underpinnings of the marketplace-of-ideas model of the First Amendment 
are based on assumptions of rational decision making that are implausible in modern society).  
104 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 270–73. 
105 “The term ‘perpetual succession’ is not generally construed to imply corporate 
immortality, but rather a continuity of existence, irrespective of that of its component members, 
limited in duration to the period stated in its charter or the act authorizing the granting of it.” 1 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 6 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010) (footnote omitted); see also Erik Devos et al., 
How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency 
Improvements as Explanations for Synergies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1179 (2009) (discussing the 
sources of merger gains); Scott D. Dyreng et al., Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance, 83 ACCT. 
REV. 61 (2008) (describing a new measure of long term corporate tax avoidance). 
106 Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further argument, the Austin 
majority undertook to distinguish wealthy individuals from corporations on the ground that 
 
[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of 
assets.” This does not suffice, however, to allow laws prohibiting speech. “It is 
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the 
forfeiture of First Amendment rights. 
 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990) and Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
107 Id. (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
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Second, the structural advantages of corporations to amass wealth 
are exacerbated by the mandate of for-profit corporations to maximize 
profits.108 While economic interests may also primarily motivate an 
individual, an individual will never face potential liability for failing 
to singularly advance economic interests, even in the context of 
political speech.109 A corporation faces this threat in the form of 
derivative suits alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. Corporate speech, 
even in the political realm, is motivated primarily by an economics 
incentive.110 Failure to adhere to this mandate exposes the corporate 
entity to liability that an individual would never face for political 
expression. The constant, mandated fidelity to economic motivation, 
even in the context of political expression, distinguishes corporate 
speech from that of an individual. 
Third, the economic motivation of corporate political speech is 
similar to the economic motivation recognized in commercial speech. 
As discussed above, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy 
conceptualized corporations as “associations” of individuals, equating 
the right to form a predominantly economic entity with the First 
Amendment right to associate in political, artistic, or pleasure-
oriented organizations. This debate mirrors some of the issues 
presented in the debate over the scope of constitutional protection 
afforded commercial speech, the predominant form of corporate 
speech.111 Commercial speech, first recognized in Virginia State 
                                                                                                                 
108 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”); see also 
Kroese v. Gen. Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1950) (noting that courts have the 
power to order a corporation’s board of directors to pay dividends if it is shown that they are in 
violation of the business judgment rule); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (“It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run 
interests of the corporation’s stockholders . . . .”). But see Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop 
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (challenging the idea that 
corporations exist only to make money for shareholders). 
109 See Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(upholding State Farm’s policy not to issue dividends over a fifteen-year period as within the 
penumbra of the business judgment rule despite being challenged in a class-action lawsuit by 
policyholders alleging that failure to pay such dividends violated the company’s duty to 
maximize profits for the policyholders); Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682 (stating that courts will not 
interfere with the decisions of corporate directors unless they commit fraud or misappropriation 
of corporate funds, or, under limited circumstances, refuse to declare dividends); see also 
Churella v. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co., 671 N.W.2d 125 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that 
policyholders failed to sufficiently plead facts to overcome the business judgment rule in 
connection with directors’ failure to distribute surplus because they did not establish that a 
failure to declare a dividend was an abuse of business discretion). 
110 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1004 (“[C]orporate speech is better understood as the 
expenditure of money in accordance with dictates of the law and the market on behalf of the 
imaginary interests of a legal fiction: the fictional shareholder.”). 
111 Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a conviction for the 
distribution of a double-faced handbill that contained a political protest on one side and an 
advertisement on the other), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
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Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,112 
receives limited constitutional protection. It is defined as expression 
that proposes a commercial transaction that is related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and his or her audience, or which is 
likely to influence consumers in their commercial decisions.113 It 
usually involves, but is not limited to advertising products for sale. 
For example, communication regarding the price and attributes of a 
consumer production and speech directed solely to the collection of a 
debt are both purely commercial.114 Commercial speech, while 
protected under the Constitution, is not treated the same as 
noncommercial speech. “[T]he distinctions between the two 
categories of speech justify subjecting governmental regulations of 
commercial speech to a review less strict than that applied to 
regulations of political speech.”115  
The commercial speech doctrine is relevant to the current debate 
because unlike the analysis undertaken in Citizens United, it 
recognizes the distorting nature of economically motivated speech 
(often from corporations), which it uses as a basis to treat such speech 
                                                                                                                 
 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (holding 
unconstitutional a Virginia statute penalizing an advertisement for abortion services in another 
state), and N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that the First 
Amendment is applicable to an advertisement in a corporation’s newspapers).  
112 425 U.S. 748.  
113 See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair 
Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2005) (examining the different 
standards of review applied to commercial and noncommercial speech). Prior to Virginia 
Pharmacy, commercial speech was thought to be outside of the protections of the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (“We are equally clear that the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). Now, it 
is commonly accepted that commercial speech falls within the ambit of the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 499 (2009) (“For First Amendment purposes, 
commercial speech is an expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience, generally in the form of commercial advertisement for the sale of goods and 
services, or speech proposing a commercial transaction.” (footnotes omitted)).  
114 See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 812 (2005) (“Speech is not rendered commercial 
by the mere fact that it relates to advertisement, that the speaker is a corporation, or that it 
criticizes a product.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566–68 (1980) (holding that the fact that an electrical utility held 
a monopoly on the sale of electricity in its service area did not establish that its advertising was 
not protected by the First Amendment). Under the Central Hudson test, speech that is false, 
misleading, or that concerns an unlawful activity receives no First Amendment protection 
because the listeners do not have an interest in such speech. For speech that concerns a lawful 
activity and is not misleading, then the restriction must pass intermediate scrutiny. The test is 
whether the regulation directly advances a substantial government interest and is not more 
extensive than necessary to advance that interest. Id. at 566. 
115 Caren Schmulen Sweetland, Note, The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech 
Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Disclosure 
Requirements, 76 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1998).  
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differently.116 That distinction, or discount, for economic motivations 
is largely abandoned—without justification—in the context of 
corporate political speech.117  
Not only is the economic motivation of commercial speech a 
distinguishing factor that warrants a lesser degree of constitutional 
protection, but such speech may not fully serve the ends intended by 
the First Amendment (e.g., expression, participation, accountability of 
government, etc.).118 Edwin Baker and others have advanced the 
argument that profit-oriented speech warrants differential treatment 
under the First Amendment on the ground that it does not advance the 
goals of liberty and self-realization served by “pure” forms of free 
speech.119 
                                                                                                                 
116 Commercial speech regulations mirror election law in distinguishing between 
disclosure requirements (presumptively valid) and prohibitions of speech (presumptively 
invalid). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down a 
state law prohibiting advertisements by attorneys, but upholding disclosure requirements). But 
see Wolfson, supra note 85, at 277–78 (discussing Zauderer and arguing that the Court’s 
“attempted distinction between mandatory disclosure and outright prohibition cannot survive 
analysis”). 
117 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects the 
resulting speech, even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who 
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.” (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))). 
118 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“In 
the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to 
fulfill its essential role in our democracy.”); see also Sweetland, supra note 115, at 474 
(“Political speech was deemed the sole embodiment of the free speech doctrine, and it was 
given a preferred position among all constitutional rights because of the essential role it plays in 
the operation of a constitutional democracy.” (footnote and internal quotations omitted)); G. 
Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in 
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 327–33 (1997) (discussing the preferred 
position enjoyed by political speech, as opposed to commercial speech, because of its role in 
advancing democratic ideals).  
119 In our present historical setting, however, commercial speech is not a manifestation of 
individual freedom or choice; unlike the broad categories of protected speech, commercial 
speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in a way that can be expected 
to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes. Therefore, profit-motivated commercial 
speech lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization, which exist for 
speech generally and which are central to justifications for the constitutional protection of 
speech—justifications which in turn define the proper scope of protection under the First 
Amendment. Baker, supra note 80, at 3; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
804–05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting), quoted in C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and 
Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 986 (2009) (“[W]hat some have considered to be the 
principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-
expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is 
clear that the communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not represent a manifestation 
of individual freedom or choice.” (footnote omitted)); Wolfson, supra note 85, at 269 (“A 
suggested rationale for the difference between the limited protection of commercial speech and 
the greater protection of political-artistic speech is the crucial role political-artistic speech plays 
in free democratic society. Political speech is essential for the workings of a free democratic 
society.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Additionally, harkening back to the marketplace-of-ideas imagery 
utilized by the majority in Citizens United (and throughout prior 
corporate political speech cases), the rights of the citizen-listener 
justify granting the corporation free speech protection under the 
assumption that such expression serves the democratic ends of the 
listener.120 However, borrowing from the commercial speech 
perspective, speech that is essentially economic in nature should be 
subject to additional regulations because of its potential to mislead the 
listener.121 The distortion potential of an economic message 
masquerading as a political message may warrant differential First 
Amendment treatment. At a minimum, the distinction deserved 
consideration by the Court in Citizens United, although it received 
none.122  
An analysis of corporate law principles leads to the conclusion that 
when corporations speak, it is speech of an economic—not a 
political—nature, due to corporations’ singular fidelity to profit 
maximization.123 The Court should not have ignored this key 
distinction between corporate and individual speech in Citizens 
United. The Court left unexamined questions such as how economic 
speech should be discounted in the marketplace of political speech. 
Because economic motivation is inherent in all corporate political 
speech, it has the potential to mislead consumers (i.e., voters) and it 
may not advance the goals of a participatory democracy. Therefore, 
the protection afforded such speech should be carefully examined. 
The discount applied to economically motivated speech in other 
arenas, such as commercial speech, should be similarly applied to 
corporate political speech. 
B. Fallacy of One Corporate Voice 
Friedrich Hayek, the legal theorist, asserted that although an 
individual can act unjustly, a society cannot; theoretically, some 
individual must have acted unjustly on behalf of the society.124 
                                                                                                                 
120 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (concluding that “society . . . is deprived of 
an ‘uninhibited marketplace of ideas’” when people choose to abstain from protected speech 
rather than vindicate their rights through litigation (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 
(2003)). 
121 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566–68 (1980).  
122 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 27, at 47–48. 
123 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (holding that the primary 
goal of a corporation is profit maximization). 
124 See C.R. McCann, Jr., F.A. Hayek: The Liberal as Communitarian, 15 REV. AUSTRIAN 
ECON. 5, 20 (2002) (“To Hayek, ‘only situations which have been created by human will can be 
called just or unjust,’ and so justice ‘always implies that some person or persons ought, or ought 
not, to have performed some action.’”); see also EAMONN BUTLER, HAYEK: HIS CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF OUR TIME (1983) (describing Hayek’s ideas 
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Identifying who acted on behalf of society is the same type of 
existential question applicable to the analysis in Citizens United. That 
case raised dualistic questions—for whom does a corporation speak 
and how does a corporation speak?  
Consider first Justice Stevens, whose Citizens United dissent 
challenged the basic idea that corporations should be protected as 
political speakers: 
It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a 
business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or 
attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the 
customers or employees, who typically have no say in such 
matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders, 
who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of 
the firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to 
management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the 
corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, 
except their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from 
using corporate funds for personal ends. . . . It is entirely 
possible that the corporation’s electoral message will conflict 
with their personal convictions.125 
Corporations must speak through money or through a representative, 
creating a type of ventriloquist speech.126 “Corporations speak by 
spending money: they hire others to speak for them. Corporate speech 
is thus an agency problem.”127 Because a corporation can engage in 
only indirect speech—funding the speech of others, or speaking 
through hired corporate representatives, such as a member of the 
board of directors or an officer—the inherent problems of agency are 
present, including delegation and alignment of interests between 
principal and agent.128  
Corporate political speech raises additional issues that strike at the 
fundamental participatory and democratic ideals served by the First 
Amendment, which is meant to protect and serve the ends of 
                                                                                                                 
 
and their significance); THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 
1984) (providing examples of Hayek’s contributions). 
125 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
126 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1002. 
127 Id. 
128 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 90–95 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the 
authority of corporate executives as agents of the corporation).  
 3/1/2011 6:30:55 PM 
2011] FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS 527 
democratic self-government.129 “Although they make enormous 
contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of 
it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed 
and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in 
fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.”130  
In Citizens United, the majority’s opinion was premised on the 
idea that corporations can speak, have a voice, and have a 
viewpoint—including a political viewpoint. Justice Kennedy wrote 
that through the independent-expenditure bans, “[t]he Government 
has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant 
segments of the economy.’”131 This same imagery of a corporate 
voice within the political arena was continued throughout the opinion 
with language such as: “[b]y suppressing the speech of manifold 
corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents 
their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising 
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”132 An 
important assumption that corporations can speak with a singular 
voice, have a singular intent, and can engage in the same type of self-
fulfillment and self-expression activities as an individual underlies the 
Court’s analysis.  
Certainly from a literal perspective, a corporation can amass and 
spend money, and spending money is a recognized form of protected 
speech under the First Amendment.133 Therefore, it logically follows 
that a corporation can speak. While a corporation can speak by 
spending money, the assumption that a corporation can speak with a 
singular voice is flawed. Except for single-shareholder corporations, 
the idea that corporations can speak with a singular voice is subject to 
same collective-intent criticisms levied against legislative history.134 
                                                                                                                 
129 See supra note 119 (discussing the argument that profit-oriented speech warrants 
differential treatment under the First Amendment on the ground that it does not advance the 
goals of liberty and self-realization served by “pure” forms of free speech) 
130 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
131 Id. at 907 (majority opinion) (second alternation in original) (quoting McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
132 Id. (emphasis added). 
133 See id. at 898 (applying the same strict scrutiny framework for restrictions on corporate 
speech as individual citizens’ speech); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) 
(holding that while governmental restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns 
and contributions did not violate the First Amendment, similar restrictions on individual 
expenditures in campaigns did). 
134 See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1462 (2007) (describing 
how, starting in the 1980s, “textualist” interpretation of statutes criticized traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation as creating new legal fictions); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, 
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) 
(outlining propositions in support of statutory text and structure as the proper foundation for 
statutory interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. 
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In the corporate context, the problems of group speech can be 
summarized using three main group phenomena: boundaries, 
aggregation, and leadership.135 Focusing on boundaries, the collective 
intent of a group decision can be challenged because 
the boundaries of a group can profoundly affect the 
legitimacy of speech or other actions on “its” behalf. A group 
defined too broadly may have permanent minorities within it 
that have needs or wills that are never met; one defined too 
narrowly will tend to ignore the interests and desires of those 
outside it.136 
Aggregation is also a problem because the decision of the group may 
be different from the decision of the individuals comprising the 
group. Finally, the problem with leadership is that those driving an 
organization may have a disparate, more powerful voice than the 
individual members. This concern certainly reflects the reality of 
corporate governance where the voice of the board of directors (and 
even institutional shareholders in publically-held companies) can 
easily overpower the voice of any single shareholder. 
Corporate law principles recognize that group decision making has 
limitations and that corporations contain multiple, and often disparate, 
voices. As a threshold matter, political expenditures and contributions 
are management decisions decided by a vote of the board of directors 
or delegated to management, but are not subject to shareholder 
votes.137 Political expenditure decisions—as directors currently 
                                                                                                                 
 
L. REV. 673, 684–85 (1997) (discussing the textualist critique of legislative intent in statutory 
interpretation); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) 
(discussing the difficulty of ascertaining legislative intent because of the impossibility of 
knowing the intent of each individual legislator); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) (arguing that legislative 
intent will be better determined not by the judicial system, but by legislative agencies); Kenneth 
A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that legislative intent is an unsound and unpredictable 
approach to statutory interpretation). 
135 See Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1021 (“[C]onstitutional law largely ignores the 
special character of corporate speech. At most, it treats corporate speech as an instance of 
ordinary group speech . . . . [But] many of the problems of group speech are well known. . . . 
[They include] the boundary problem, the aggregate problem, and the leadership problem.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
136 Id. at 1022. 
137 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a), 151–153, 157, 161, 166 (2001 & Supp. 
2008) (delineating the general powers of the board of directors with respect to issuance of stock 
and shareholder rights); Grimes v. Alteon Inc., 804 A.2d 256, 260 (Del. 2002) (“One must read 
in pari materia the relevant statutory provisions of the Corporation Law. First there is the 
fundamental corporate governance principle set forth in 8 Del. C. § 141(a) that the ‘business and 
affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by and under the direction of’ the board of 
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implement them—therefore lack the approval or dissent of the 
citizen-shareholders,138 and there is no mechanism for shareholders to 
obtain detailed information regarding corporate political expenditures 
absent voluntary disclosures. Nonetheless, the Court in Citizens 
United specifically rejected the government’s argument that 
protecting dissenting shareholders warranted the ban on independent 
campaign expenditures.139 The Court reasoned that the “procedures of 
corporate democracy” were sufficient to protect any dissenting 
shareholder from supporting incongruent political speech.140  
Without engaging in a discussion of the efficacy of shareholder 
democracy or shareholder protection mechanisms,141 it is worth 
                                                                                                                 
 
directors. One then turns to the board’s role in stock issuance set forth in the relevant sections of 
Subchapter V of Title 8. The provisions in this Subchapter relate to the issuance of capital stock, 
subscriptions for additional shares, options and rights agreements. Taken together, they are 
calculated to advance two fundamental policies of the Corporation Law: (1) to consolidate in its 
board of directors the exclusive authority to govern and regulate a corporation’s capital 
structure; and (2) to ensure certainty in the instruments upon which the corporation’s capital 
structure is based.” (omission in original)); Corporate Governance After Citizens United: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 66 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Michael 
Klausner, Nancy and Charles Munger Professor of Business and Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law School) (“What can shareholders do under the governance regime if they would like to 
influence management’s use of corporate funds for political activities? The answer is ‘not 
much.’ Management will control corporate speech just as it controls other expenditures.”). 
138 Recent legislative proposals suggest that this may change. See, e.g., Shareholder 
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing amendments to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would require a budget for corporate political 
expenditures to be preapproved by a shareholder vote at the annual meeting and a subsequent 
report filed with the SEC detailing the political contributions and expenditures made); see also 
Susan M. Liss, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Forward to CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE 
CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 3, 3 (2010), available at http:// 
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/corporate_campaign_spending_giving_shareholders_a
_voice/ (suggesting a series of reforms to the corporate campaign-finance regulations that would 
require a shareholder vote to approve corporate political spending and increased disclosure of 
actual expenditures and contributions made).  
139 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (comparing the limitations on 
corporate political expenditures to a limitation on political speech of media corporations, which 
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment). 
140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 794 (1978)). By “corporate democracy procedures,” the Court was referring to the powers 
of shareholders to elect the board of directors who then make the decision about political 
expenditures and contributions. The idea is that unpopular expenditures could result in removal 
of the director(s) from the board so that shareholders have an indirect voice or vote in the 
decisions regarding political expenditures. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 232–
40 (discussing shareholder voting and the election of directors). 
For a discussion on the threat of compelled speech, see infra Part IV.C. 
141 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005) (arguing that shareholders’ existing power to replace directors is 
insufficient to secure the adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements that 
management disfavors and suggesting an alternative regime that would allow shareholders to 
initiate and adopt rules-of-the-game decisions to change the company’s charter or state of 
incorporation); see also Hearings, supra note 137, at 66 (statement of Prof. Michael Klausner) 
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noting that corporate law has mechanisms outside of traditional 
shareholder elections that recognize the disparate and heterogeneous 
voices of shareholders. Two examples are shareholder derivative suits 
and, for publically traded corporations, shareholder proxy proposals. 
Shareholder derivative suits demonstrate that corporate democratic 
procedures cannot address all shareholder concerns; they are, as noted 
above, an alternative avenue outside of the traditional voting rights 
designed to facilitate director accountability to shareholders. Through 
derivative suits, corporate law recognizes an exception to traditional 
standing requirements by allowing an aggrieved shareholder to bring 
an action not in her name, but on behalf of the corporation.142 In 
derivative suits, the plaintiff-shareholder is allowed to usurp a power 
otherwise delegated exclusively to the board of directors—the power 
to decide whether to bring a lawsuit. And because the plaintiff-
shareholders may allege mismanagement by the board, shareholder 
derivative suits act as another form of shareholder control over the 
board of directors in addition to traditional shareholder democracy 
rights (e.g., the right to vote at annual meetings).  
Shareholder derivative suits inform the present debate on the 
fallacy of a singular corporate vote. Derivative suits recognize the 
voice of even a single dissenting shareholder within a large 
corporation and give that shareholder the right to challenge the 
directors about the management of the corporation (owned by the 
shareholders), although their challenges must still be plausible enough 
to survive a motion to dismiss brought by the corporation.143 
                                                                                                                 
 
(“The only tool available to shareholders to influence management’s political expenditures is 
their right to vote annually for nominees to the company’s board of directors. That mechanism, 
however, is poorly designed for this purpose. It does not allow shareholders to exert any sort of 
advance approval power. Nor does it realistically allow shareholders to vote out of office 
directors whom they believe, after the fact, have allowed management to misallocate corporate 
funds for political activities.”). 
142 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 191–202 (describing the procedural aspects of 
derivative litigation including standing, holding, and representation requirements for 
shareholders to usurp management power and bring litigation in the corporation’s name).  
143 See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCN, 2010 WL 1838968 (Del. Ch. May 
3, 2010) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a stockholder derivative and 
auditing action alleging that a billing scheme in a family company benefitted certain members 
of the board without benefitting other stockholders); In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., 
No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (granting the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss because the plaintiffs could not show conflicts of interest in the disputed transactions); 
Case Fin., Inc. v. Alden, No. 1184-VCP, 2009 WL 2581873 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2009) (holding 
that parent corporation had standing to bring derivative suit against director of subsidiary 
because director had a minimum duty to report certain transactions to the parent company); In re 
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that directors 
were not entitled to a stay in favor of a simultaneously filed federal suit because the plaintiffs 
properly pleaded wasteful spending); In re Affiliated Computer Serv., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 
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Derivative suits are not one of the traditional mechanisms of 
corporate democracy; they are employed when that process has 
allegedly broken down. The Court’s analysis in Citizens United did 
not acknowledge that disparate voices may exist within a 
corporation144 or that corporate law mechanisms actually recognize 
these dissenting voices.  
Derivative suits dispel the notion that corporations can speak with 
a singular voice—the fallacy that a corporation can have a political 
opinion or even a cohesive political agenda. The disparate voices of 
shareholders, or even a single shareholder, are given a platform in 
derivative proceedings, but the paradigm envisioned in Citizens 
United ignores these voices. While derivative suits exemplify the 
fallacy of a single corporate voice, they do not present a reasonable 
remedy for the dissenting shareholder with regard to corporate 
political expenditures. A derivative suit could prevent future 
corporate political speech only if the plaintiffs proved that such 
speech constituted a breach of fiduciary duty (i.e., failure to serve the 
profit-maximization principle) or waste of corporate assets. The high 
costs of such suits and their low success rate make them an 
unattractive and unrealistic remedy, even for claims that could 
survive the business judgment rule and the accompanying procedural 
roadblocks.145 
                                                                                                                 
 
2821-VCL, 2009 WL 296078 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2009) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for failure 
to show that the action demanded on behalf of the directors was futile, or that demand futility 
was excused); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that although 
certain provisions of the defendant’s certificate of incorporation limited directors from personal 
liability, the plaintiffs had stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment); In 
re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 1956-CC, 2008 WL 762482 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2008) 
(holding that it was appropriate to stay a shareholder derivative action to allow the defendant to 
investigate claims and issues and determine which action was in best interest of shareholders); 
Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that the court had personal 
jurisdiction over corporation’s outside counsel in an action against the board of directors and 
outside counsel for breach of fiduciary duty and wasteful spending); Melzer v. CNET Networks, 
Inc., 934 A.2d 912 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting shareholders access to documents that could 
establish a sustained or systematic failure of the board to establish oversight and thus establish 
demand futility); Brandin v. Deason, 941 A.2d 1020 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying the defendant-
officers’ motion to stay in an action alleging breach of fiduciary duty by engaging in scheme to 
backdate stock options). 
144 The potential for disparate voices within a corporation occurs whenever there is more 
than one shareholder or entity holding shares. This situation occurs with both privately held and 
publically traded corporations. 
145 See generally Tucker Nees, supra note 2, at 205–06 (highlighting the obstacles to a 
successful shareholder derivative suit); see also supra note 143 (discussing the procedural and 
substantive barriers to bringing a successful shareholder derivative suit). 
Simply because shareholder derivative suits are not a viable citizen-shareholder remedy 
for compelled speech, does not necessarily reduce the threat that they pose to a corporation in 
encouraging profit-maximizing policies, even in the context of political expenditures, because of 
the costs of these suits in terms of reputation harm, litigation defense expenses, and time. 
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Another corporate law mechanism that recognizes the diverse and 
disparate voices of a corporation’s shareholders is the shareholder 
proxy proposal.146 The proxy-proposal process, as outlined in Rule 
14a-8, gives individual shareholders the right to propose resolutions 
independent from management, to have those resolutions included in 
the management’s proxy statement, and to have the remaining 
shareholders vote on the resolution at the annual meeting.147 The 
efficacy of shareholder proxy proposals as a mechanism of 
meaningful control over the board of directors is questionable.148 For 
this Article’s purpose, what is important is that shareholder proxy 
proposals are another example of corporate law recognizing the 
disparate voices of shareholders and acknowledging that the 
traditional corporate democracy mechanisms (i.e., voting at the 
annual meeting) have limitations.  
Corporate law recognizes the disparate and heterogeneous voices 
of shareholders within a corporation through mechanisms such as 
shareholder derivative suits and shareholder proxy proposals. The 
Supreme Court’s crucial assumption in Citizens United that 
corporations can speak with one voice and that management decisions 
(such as corporate expenditures) can represent the collective intent of 
the shareholders is inconsistent with the legal and regulatory realities 
of corporate law. In evaluating the constitutional role of corporate 
political speech in our electoral process, it seems disingenuous to 
engage in a discussion that is devoid of a corporate law context. By 
examining corporate political speech rights in a vacuum, the Court 
insulated the discussion from the complexities of how corporations 
are conceptualized and regulated in practice. And it is only in such a 
vacuum that broad, sweeping overgeneralizations—such as the 
Court’s recognition of a singular corporate voice—can be made. 
Believing that there is a singular corporate voice was an important 
                                                                                                                 
146 For an overview of the rules governing—and litigation related to—the shareholder 
proxy-voting system, see LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAWS 
128–37 (3d ed. 2007). 
147 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010) (requiring management to include a shareholder-
initiated proposal in the proxy statement anytime the proposal is a proper matter for 
consideration under the laws of the state of incorporation); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 214–18 (2d ed. 2006) (pointing out that a shareholder 
proposal may be excluded if it: (1) is improper under state law, (2) would violate any law to 
which it would be subject if implemented, (3) is materially false or misleading, (4) represents a 
personal grievance or special interest, (5) is not significantly related to the issuer’s business, (6) 
is something the issuer lacks the power to implement, (7) deals exclusively with the issuer’s 
ordinary business operations, (8) deals with election to the issuer’s board of directors, (9) relates 
to specific amounts of cash dividends, (10) contradicts a proposal submitted by the issuer at the 
same meeting, (11) has already been substantially implemented, (12) substantially duplicates 
another submitted proposal, or (13) is a resubmission of a previously unsuccessful proposal). 
148 See HAZEN, supra note 147, at 212 (“[S]hareholder proposals typically fail miserably”). 
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stepping-stone on the Court’s path to concluding that corporate 
political speech and individual political speech are indistinguishable.  
C. Threat of Compelled Speech 
Corporate political speech is distinguishable from individual 
political speech because when a corporation engages in political 
speech, there is a threat of compelled speech. From a corporate law 
perspective, Citizens United leaves shareholders, particularly those of 
mutual funds,149 without meaningful control over how their 
investments are utilized in the political arena. Investors are in the 
unhappy position of potentially choosing between political integrity 
and economic gain. Blurring the lines between the economic and 
political interests of both corporations and citizen-shareholders 
undermines the First Amendment principles supposedly advanced in 
Citizens United. Comingling citizens’ economic and political interests 
also undermines the system of checks and balances on management 
control and accountability to shareholders that corporate law, like our 
political system, strives to maintain.150 
The Court extended full First Amendment protection to corporate 
political speech by recognizing, in part, the freedom of association 
rights of the citizen-shareholders. The Court reasoned that restricting 
corporate speech would also restrict the voices of the individual 
shareholders, who simply chose to join a for-profit organization 
instead of another type of organization.151 This reasoning reflects the 
Court’s assumption that when corporations speak they communicate a 
cohesive message that reflects the interests of the individual 
shareholders. Freedom of association is protected only if the citizen-
                                                                                                                 
149 The individual mutual fund investor finances the underlying corporations’ political 
speech by providing the money with which the mutual fund purchases the corporations’ stock. 
But because the mutual fund itself is the corporations’ shareholder, it is the mutual fund that has 
the right to bring a derivative action or offer a proxy proposal, not the individual mutual fund 
investor.  
150 See Tucker Nees, supra note 2, at 203 (“Discerning this fine balancing point between 
the two competing interests of director accountability and director authority has been a long-
standing, although elusive, goal of corporate law.”); see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER 
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1934) (discussing the 
separation of ownership and control and the concentration of economic power in modern 
economies); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 785–86 (2006) (advocating for the authority-versus-accountability 
balance established in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)); Ann 
M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 43–44 (2008) (discussing accountability and the 
principal-agent relationship in the corporate context). 
151 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906–07 (2010) (stating that a ban on corporate 
expenditures “permits the Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of 
citizens”). 
 3/1/2011 6:30:55 PM 
534 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
shareholder’s political interests align with those of the corporation, as 
determined by the board of directors and dictated by profit-
maximization principles.  
A second, broader criticism of the Court’s assumptions regarding 
the singular corporate voice and freedom of association is that 
corporate speech does not reflect the view of any citizen-shareholder:  
The shareholders in whose interests corporations must speak 
are not the human beings who own (or, more often, on whose 
behalf other institutions own) the shares. Indeed, they are not 
citizens at all, but rather moments in the market, legal 
abstractions that have interests quite different from those of 
real citizens in their full complexity. Unlike real people, the 
fictional shareholder is an entirely one-sided abstraction; it 
seeks to increase the value of its shares without regard for any 
other value. Corporations, then, when they act as they are 
supposed to, pursue only one goal of the many that are 
important in a civilized society. Corporate agents, in short, 
work for a principle, not a principal.152 
Under this view, the corporation is improperly given a voice 
independent from all of its citizen-shareholders; the artificial entity is 
allowed full participation rights separate from the input or influence 
of any of its citizen-shareholders.153 Without the guarantee that the 
political speech of the corporation comports with its members’ 
opinions, the potential for perversion of the message is evident. This 
distortion argument is distinguishable from Austin’s antidistortion 
rationale, which Justice Kennedy rejected in Citizens United. Here, 
the potential distortion does not stem from the ability to amass wealth 
from the marketplace; rather, it stems from the fact that the 
aggregation of citizen-shareholder voices gives weight to a “body” 
that does not actually exist. 
The majority in Citizens United brushed aside concerns over the 
dissenting shareholder as a justification for the corporate independent 
expenditure ban. The Court was confident that shareholder democracy 
and a ready-made secondary market would be sufficient remedies for 
an aggrieved shareholder who disagrees with a corporate political 
expenditure and who does not want her investment used to promote a 
political agenda inconsistent with her own.154 But simply relying on 
                                                                                                                 
152 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1003. 
153 Cf. supra note 119 (arguing that profit-motivated speech lacks the crucial connections 
with individual liberty and self-realization that accompany personal speech). 
154 Therefore the Court felt that § 441b was both under- and overinclusive with respect to 
 3/1/2011 6:30:55 PM 
2011] FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS 535 
the existing mechanisms of corporate democracy does not eliminate 
the threat of compelled speech to the dissenting shareholder, nor does 
it eliminate the risk of putting investors in a double bind. 
Additionally, the ability to sell one’s shares presents a false choice for 
investors and exerts no shaping pressure on corporate political 
expenditures. 
Citizens United is an influential decision that affects not only the 
democratic landscape of our society, but also directly impacts the 
rights of the nearly 150 million Americans that own stock.155 Stock 
ownership is no longer a voluntary activity reserved for the upper 
class. With the reduction in pension plans and the proliferation of tax-
deferred employer retirement accounts, nearly half of all Americans 
own stock; almost eighty percent of whom are invested in mutual 
funds, primarily through tax-deferred accounts.156 The rapid rise in 
stock ownership has been fueled by the proliferation of defined-
contribution retirement plans provided by employers.157 
                                                                                                                 
 
the shareholder-protection rationale. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 
As to the first, if Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting 
shareholders, it would not have banned corporate speech in only certain media within 
30 or 60 days before an election. A dissenting shareholder’s interests would be 
implicated by speech in any media at any time. As to the second, the statute is 
overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including nonprofit corporations and 
for-profit corporations with only single shareholders. As to other corporations, the 
remedy is not to restrict speech but to consider and explore other regulatory 
mechanisms. 
 
Id. 
155 For a discussion of the increase in bond and equities ownership in America, see INV. 
CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASSOC., EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN 
AMERICA (2008), available at www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners.pdf. In 1989, when 
equity ownership in America was first calculated, thirty-two percent of American households 
owned stocks or bonds. As of the first quarter of 2008, forty-seven percent of households in 
America—approximately 54.5 million citizens—owned stocks or bonds, falling from a peak of 
fifty-three percent in 2001. Id. at 9; see also J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 2:30 (2009), available at Westlaw SECIDUSL (“There are four 
primary means by which individuals may own stock. Thirty-four million directly own shares in 
publicly traded companies. Twenty seven million own shares in equity mutual funds outside of 
retirement saving plans and pension accounts; some of these individuals also own stock directly. 
Nearly 34 million own equity through self-directed retirement plans such as Individual 
Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans or 401(k) plans, and 48 million own equity through defined 
contribution pension plans. There is substantial overlap among these four methods of 
shareownership. When this overlap is accounted for, a total of 84 million shareowners hold 
stock through at least one of these channels, and three million hold stock through all four 
channels.”).  
156 See INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASSOC, supra note 155, at 32 
(explaining that forty-three percent of stockholding Americans with investments in mutual funds 
hold bond-based mutual funds and forty-five percent hold hybrid mutual funds).  
157 See id. at 15 (“Ownership inside tax-deferred accounts accounted for most of the 
increase in the 1989 to 2001 period and has since remained steady, which implies that most of 
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Consequently, a significant portion of the voting population is at risk 
of being put in a double bind as a result of the Court’s sanctioning of 
corporate political speech. Citizen-shareholders may have to choose 
between fidelity to a political ideal and pursuit of economic 
advancement.  
With mutual fund ownership, the additional distance between the 
investor and the first-tier158 corporation’s managers who make the 
political expenditures exacerbates the tenuous influence that 
shareholders exert over directors. The increased distance between 
shareholders and decision makers makes it less likely that 
shareholders would even be aware of the corporation’s political 
expenditures. Additionally, the indirect ownership of first-tier 
corporate stock by mutual fund investors makes them ineligible to 
bring derivative suits or to suggest proxy proposals.159 
The more immediate remedy would be for the dissenting 
shareholder, whether a direct shareholder or a mutual fund investor, 
to sell her shares and withdraw her financial support from the 
personally objectionable message.160 As private stock ownership 
                                                                                                                 
 
the decline since 2001 occurred outside tax-deferred accounts. Tax-deferred accounts include 
employer-sponsored retirement plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).”); see also 
Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers 
of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 352 (2010) (“At one time, a relatively small segment of the public 
invested in publicly-traded securities. Now a significant proportion of the U.S. population owns 
publicly-traded stocks, either directly or indirectly. A major trend in the investment world has 
been the remarkable growth of stock ownership through defined-contribution retirement plans. 
Additionally, there has been even more remarkable growth in mutual funds.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
158 First tier manager refer to the board of directors for company X. Second tier refers to 
the management of the mutual fund that is invested in company X. 
159 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 194–96 (discussing the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement to establish standing for a derivative suit which requires that the plaintiff 
in a derivative action be a shareholder of named company defendant at the time when the 
complained of act or omission occurred through the time of judgment); see also John A. 
Haslem, Why Have Mutual Fund Independent Directors Failed as “Shareholder Watchdogs”?, 
J. INVESTING, Spring 2010, at 7 (arguing that independent mutual-fund directors have failed 
shareholders in their role as “shareholder watchdogs” under the Investment Company Act of 
1940); John A. Haslem, What Mutual Fund Investors Should Have: Normative Transparency of 
Disclosure (Oct. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1287483 (arguing that increased mutual-fund disclosure requirements would help serve the 
shareholder-watchdog function of independent directors under the Investment Company Act of 
1940); cf. Miguel A. Ferreira et al., The Geography of Mutual Funds: The Advantage of Having 
Distant Investors (Univ. of S. Cal. Marshall Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Paper No. FBE 
07-10, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571838 (arguing that mutual funds and 
other investment vehicles with increased owner/management distance create an environment 
that allows the fund to take more risk and enjoy higher performance). 
160 Justice Scalia described the dissenting shareholder’s situation in his dissent in Austin in 
the following way: 
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becomes the primary vehicle for citizens to save for retirement, and as 
pension plans give way to the rise of 401(k) plans as the predominant 
employer-based retirement-plan vehicle, the “choice” of stock 
ownership is eroded by the realities of participation in widespread 
economic and social norms. Moreover, the investments available in 
these plans are often severely restricted. Employer plans are often 
limited to a list of approved stocks, and, even more commonly, a 
limited list of participating mutual funds.161 Consequently, the choices 
available to the citizen investor are often severely restricted in this 
context. Even the simple decision to sell one’s stock may be 
complicated or restricted by the stocks and/or funds available within 
the employer’s plan. 
The weakened exit remedy has as additional impact on corporate 
political speech because without the ability to exit, the shareholder 
cannot exert pressure on the board to align its political messages with 
the views of its shareholders. “[A]n organization that as its primary 
activity provides valuable and difficult-to-obtain services for its 
members may then find its political activities relatively unconstrained 
by the threat of exit.”162 The exit threat is not meaningful in the 
context of employer-defined plans, nor does it persuade management 
to shape corporate political expenditures.  
                                                                                                                 
 
[I]n joining [a for-profit corporation], the shareholder knows that management 
may take any action that is ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a 
specified supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is 
designed to make a profit. That is the deal. The corporate actions to which the 
shareholder exposes himself, therefore, include many things that he may find 
politically or ideologically uncongenial . . . . His only protections against such 
assaults upon his ideological commitments are (1) his ability to persuade a majority 
(or the requisite minority) of his fellow shareholders that the action should not be 
taken, and ultimately (2) his ability to sell his stock. 
 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686–87 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
161 See Colleen M. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
469, 477–80 (describing the contours of most 401(k) plans).  
162 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1029. The weakened exit threat does not present the same 
problem from other types of noncorporate associations where the organizations are constrained 
in their actions by the threat of member exit.  
 
Organizations that depend on ongoing fund raising or membership for their 
support and that engage exclusively or almost exclusively in political, speech and 
lobbying activities fit this model best. Exit will assure that the organization continues 
to represent most members most of the time, even if it is not possible for any set of 
political activities to match the opinions of all members at any time. 
 
Id. at 1028.  
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If, say, Republican shareholders disapprove of management’s 
use of corporate funds to support a Democratic candidate, 
their sales of shares will have no effect on management. 
Indeed, management will not even know the sales occurred. 
The shares will be bought by other investors who do not 
know of, or are not bothered by, the expenditures.163 
The obvious remedy then for incongruent personal/corporate 
political speech would be for the dissenting shareholder to use the 
channels of corporate democracy to elect a new board of directors. 
That path is flawed if for no other reason than the time delay between 
objectionable corporate political expenditures and the remedy of a 
replaced board. Not only must the shareholders wait for the annual 
meeting, but they must also wage a proxy contest to replace existing 
board members, and possibly repeat the process over the course of 
several years to change a staggered board.164 Given the time-sensitive 
nature of political campaigns, this time delay and the costs associated 
with waging such a contest leave citizen-shareholders without a 
meaningful remedy. 
The remedy of a ready-made secondary market for stock where a 
dissenting shareholder can sell her shares offers little meaningful 
relief, especially for the mutual fund investor. Nor do the channels of 
shareholder democracy provide a real vehicle to express dissent. 
Meanwhile, the threat of compelled speech is significant. Take for 
example a direct investor in an oil company who opposes off-shore 
drilling. If the oil company finances issue advertisements regarding 
off-shore drilling and endorsement ads for candidates supporting off-
shore drilling, what recourse is available to the investor? As 
discussed, the channels of corporate democracy may potentially 
provide relief in the long term, after the shareholder’s money has 
been used to finance personally objectionable political messages and 
after the shareholder invests the time and money necessary to 
successfully wage a contest. There is no immediate recourse, 
however, for the investor—except to sell her shares, causing a 
political/economic bifurcation of interests. Given the constraints of 
investing within a defined plan and the fungibility of investors, the 
exit solution provides neither a meaningful remedy for the investor 
nor a threat to management. 
                                                                                                                 
163 Hearings, supra note 137, at 67 (statement of Prof. Michael Klausner). 
164 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor 
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 146 (2010) (describing how staggered boards create 
obstacles to stockholder action). 
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If one looks at the flipside of this example, at an oil company 
direct investor who supports off-shore drilling, the issue of compelled 
speech becomes much more apparent. If the oil company endorsed a 
candidate who opposed off-shore drilling or ran issue advertisements 
against off-shore drilling, it could run afoul of the profit-
maximization principle discussed above. The investor who supports 
off-shore drilling has the same attenuated channels of corporate 
democracy as the investor in the first example—she can try to replace 
the board of directors at the next election, and she can initiate proxy 
proposals related to the company’s stance on off-shore drilling. The 
investor can also sell her shares, creating an economic/political 
bifurcation. If this investor owns her shares directly, she has an 
additional remedy; she may have grounds to challenge the company’s 
political expenditures under Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., arguing that 
they violate the profit-maximization principle and the business 
judgment rule.165 Even though the directors would have the protection 
of the business judgment rule, which would likely prevent this 
challenge from succeeding,166 the dissenting shareholder would still 
have a mechanism to voice disagreement and perhaps influence the 
corporate political speech. The mere threat of such a suit could 
influence how the company makes political expenditures, thereby 
giving the dissenting shareholder a voice. When one compares the 
sway of a shareholder whose political pursuits are in line with profit 
maximization and to the sway of a shareholder whose political 
pursuits are not, it is clear that the former wields much more influence 
than the latter. Individual political agendas that align with profit 
maximization will be favored. This disparity illustrates that the threat 
                                                                                                                 
165 As Bainbridge notes: 
 
[S]ome courts and commentators argue that the business judgment rule shields 
directors from liability so long as they act in good faith. Others contend that the rule 
simply raises the liability bar from mere negligence to, say, gross negligence or 
recklessness. 
The other conception one sees in the case law treats the rule as an abstention 
doctrine that creates a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims. 
The court will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’ 
conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule by showing that one 
or more of its preconditions are lacking. 
 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 128, at 96; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 
2000) (“[D]irectors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or 
lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot 
be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process 
that includes the failure to consider all materials facts reasonably available.”). 
166 See Tucker Nees, supra note 2, at 225–28 (2010) (highlighting the procedural and 
substantive barriers to shareholder success in derivative proceedings).  
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of compelled individual speech increases when corporate political 
speech also promotes profit maximization. 
The threat of compelled speech is also higher for mutual fund 
investors whose portfolio contains an indirect investment in the same 
oil company. The mutual fund investor has even fewer remedies 
available to her because of the increased distance between her and the 
oil company’s board of directors. She lacks participation rights in the 
channels of corporate democracy. In fact, she may not even know that 
the fund is invested in the oil company or that the company is 
engaged in this behavior. It is also a difficult decision to sell shares in 
the entire fund due to political disagreement with one fund holding.  
One might argue that the diluted remedy for the mutual fund 
investor indicates a diluted harm to the investor. How harmful can the 
incongruent speech be when it is only from one firm out of one 
hundred composite firms comprising an index? When a significant 
portion of the voting population is invested in this type of investment 
vehicle, however, the aggregate effect of dissonant or incongruent 
political speech is hard to ignore. An individual occurrence may seem 
insignificant, but the aggregate weight of such harms warrants 
consideration even if not significant to the individual. Our law 
recognizes the value of aggregate harms in mechanisms such as class 
action lawsuits and allowing a series of seemingly insignificant 
breaches over time to constitute a material breach.167 Here too the 
                                                                                                                 
167 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (defining the procedural rules for class action lawsuits); 
PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION 
LAW § 4:14 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL (“The most insidious type of ‘cardinal’ change 
is that created by the cumulative impact of numerous changes, none of which individually 
would be deemed ‘cardinal.’ Contractors refer to this financial peril as ‘death by a thousand 
cuts.’ Where the cumulative effect of numerous changes is judicially determined to constitute a 
‘cardinal change,’ i.e., a material breach of contract, contract performance may be ‘abandoned,’ 
and the financial impact remediated under common law breach of contract principles.”); 
HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11:17 (1999) (discussing what 
constitutes substantial impairment of value); 4 LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-612:23 (3d ed. 2006) (“Determination as to whether an 
alleged breach of the installment sales contract constituted substantial impairment of the entire 
contract is dependent upon a cumulative effect of the breaching party’s performance under the 
contract based on the totality of the circumstances.”); 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:5 (7th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw MCLAUGHLIN 
(“[I]n a diversity-based class action the separate and distinct individual claims of class members 
may not be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement . . . . The claims of each 
individual class member, however, whether related or unrelated, may be aggregated. For 
example, each class member may aggregate his or her own claims for compensatory and 
punitive damages.” (footnote omitted)); 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45:25 (4th ed. 2000) (“The determination whether a 
nonconformity in one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract, 
thereby excusing the buyer from further performance, is dependent upon the cumulative effect 
of the seller’s performance based on the totality of the circumstances, which may include the 
cumulative effect of a series of nonconforming installments.” (footnote omitted)); Carter Ott, In 
re Tobacco II Cases: Potential Erosion of the Standing Requirement in Class Actions, 16 No. 8 
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aggregate harm of incongruent political speech should be recognized 
despite the minimal effect on the rights of the individual citizen-
shareholder. 
Both direct and indirect investors face potential bifurcation of 
political and economic interests and therefore are subject to the threat 
of compelled speech. Relying on corporate democracy or the 
economic/political bifurcation of selling one’s shares when one 
disagrees with the corporation’s political speech are empty remedies. 
The Court relied on the assumed efficacy of these remedies in 
dismissing the argument that § 441b’s ban on corporate independent 
expenditures was a necessary mechanism to protect shareholders from 
compelled incongruent political speech. Stock ownership is 
widespread, and the majority of investors own their stock through 
employer plans with a restricted pool of stocks. The limitations of 
corporate democracy, and the exacerbating effect of being an indirect 
owner through a mutual fund, reveal the flaws in the Court’s 
dismissal of the threat of compelled shareholder speech. The danger 
of engaging in the First Amendment debate regarding corporate 
political speech rights without grounding that discussion in the 
context of the economic, political, and legal realities of corporations 
is an opinion that rests a crucial decision with far reaching impact 
upon flawed assumptions. 
D. Prevalence of Regulated Speech in Corporate Law 
The Court’s assertion that the law does not make distinctions 
based on the identity of the speaker is patently false in the context of 
corporate law; in fact a great deal of speech is regulated or compelled 
based upon the corporate identity of the speaker.168 The corporate 
charter filing requirements are a striking example. These, along with 
the requisite continuing disclosures and securities regulations—
including registration and proxy requirements at both the state and 
                                                                                                                 
 
ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 2 (Sept. 16, 2009), available at Westlaw ANCALR 
(“[F]ederal courts may adjudicate class actions in which the value of the class claims, computed 
in the aggregate, exceeds $5 million; there are at least 100 class members; and there is minimal 
diversity of citizenship . . . .”). 
168 Applying the First Amendment to the question of securities-related corporate speech is 
complicated by its multiplicity of audiences (e.g., employees, journalists, shareholders, etc.) and 
the wide range of issues involved (e.g., sale of new securities, accounting numbers, commentary 
on public issues such as global warming, etc.). DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 17, at 46. To 
state that securities-related speech is purely corporate speech about stock that is issued to 
investors is a drastically oversimplified view of the situation, but one which is adopted for the 
purposes of the arguments advanced above; it is perhaps also illustrative of the fallacy of both a 
single corporate voice and a single corporate audience. 
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federal levels—create a slew of corporate speech based solely on the 
corporate identity of the entity.169 Securities regulations typically 
focus on disclosure obligations or compelled speech. “Obvious 
examples of this are the registration statement requirements contained 
in the Securities Act of 1933 . . . . Issuers and reporting companies are 
required to disclose a wide range of business and financial 
information. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 further extended 
reporting requirements in a variety of areas.”170 
Securities regulations can be onerous, requiring registration before 
a corporation can take a certain action, such as offering for sale a new 
class or series of securities (stock) in the company.171 Because of the 
temporal element—compliance with a government regulation is 
required before the company may speak to potential investors in the 
form of a prospectus—such securities regulations can be analogized 
to prior restraints, which present the greatest challenge to First 
Amendment freedoms.172 Critics of securities regulations make the 
argument that such regulations violate the First Amendment. 
In technical-financial disclosures, as in political speech, the 
government’s power to require specific disclosure is the 
power to mandate the government’s version of proper 
                                                                                                                 
169 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006) (establishing SEC securities registration 
requirements); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2010) (setting forth required contents of articles of 
incorporation). For a database of state securities registration and reporting forms, often called 
“blue sky laws,” see Blue Sky Laws, SECURITIESLINKS, http://www.seclinks.com/id16.html (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2011).  
170 Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to Securities 
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 803 (2007). 
171 For example, under the Truth in Securities Disclosure Act—section 5 of the ’33 Act—
the corporation must file a registration statement with the SEC before it can offer any of the 
securities for sale. “The SEC can, by administrative action or with the ‘assistance’ of court 
injunctive action, engage in prior restraint of prohibited corporate disclosure.” Wolfson, supra 
note 85, at 287.  
Tender offers and solicitations are also subject to prior registration requirements in the 
form of a Tender Offer Solicitation/Recommendation Schedule 14D-9 for anyone (whether it be 
the company management, a shareholder, or a potential acquirer) who solicits or makes a 
recommendation regarding a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b)(1) (2010). 
Other examples of compelled/regulated corporate securities speech are section 4(2) of the 
’33 Act, which exempts nonpublic offerings from registration and restricts general solicitation 
or advertising of such securities by the issuer, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); fraud and insider trading 
regulations under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 243.100; and 
regulation FD, which prevents material nonpublic disclosures to certain parties unless such 
disclosures are made to the public at large, Page, supra note 170, at 805. 
172 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 266 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 and 
rules, in practice, require certain corporate publications to be filed with the SEC staff for review 
prior to final dissemination to shareholders. A further example of modern prior restraint is that 
the SEC is empowered to go into a federal district court to obtain, upon a showing of failure to 
register, misrepresentation, or fraud, an injunction against the dissemination of the corporate 
publication.”).  
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orthodoxy. That power interferes with all of the various 
values that the first amendment presumes to advance. It 
interferes with the free market’s pursuit of truth because 
governments have no monopoly on that precious commodity 
and, indeed, frequently have an interest in suppressing it.173 
Corporate disclosures and registration requirements (securities 
speech) are regulated under a listener-centered rationale, not 
dissimilar from the justification used in the commercial speech 
doctrine.174 The requirement that corporations file statements about 
the company and the securities being offered with both state and 
federal agencies is rationalized as an acceptable form of compelled 
speech because it facilitates the informed and autonomous decisions 
of the listeners.175 Securities-related speech could be equated with 
commercial speech in that it is speech generated by a corporation and 
subject to special regulations because there is an economic transaction 
at the heart of the speech. Such speech, in either scenario has the 
potential to corrupt the message and mislead the listener.  
The First Amendment has generally been interpreted to afford 
the highest protection to political speech, while allowing 
restrictions on other kinds of speech, such as “fighting 
words” and commercial speech (including advertising and 
corporate communications associated with securities or 
shareholder proxy statements, where certain forms of 
corporate speech are either mandated or prohibited).176  
The blurred lines between pure political speech and the profit-
motivated speech of corporations in both commercial- and securities-
related contexts is also evident in the context of corporate political 
speech, where the profit motivation shapes and informs the corporate 
                                                                                                                 
173 Id. at 279. 
174 Securities markets are different from traditional product markets because of the firm-
specific information that drives purchases and because the sole source of that information is 
typically the firm itself. Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of 
Capital Markets, 55 BROOK L. REV. 5, 37 (1989); see also Wolfson, supra note 85, at 287–88 
(“Corporations sell products or services. The sale of shares of common stock or debt securities, 
however, is not the sale of a corporate service or product, since a share of common stock is an 
ownership interest in an organization. It carries with it certain rights to vote for the election of 
directors. It represents an interest in a managerial team that will produce a future flow of 
corporate earnings.”); cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech 
and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 163–65 (1994) (arguing for First 
Amendment protection from SEC regulations by analogizing corporate securities speech with 
political speech). 
175 See Neuborne, supra note 174, at 59 (describing the SEC’s regulation of primary-
market speech and its effect on investor choices). 
176 DRUTMAN & CRAY, supra note 17, at 46 (footnotes omitted). 
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political message, as discussed above.177 In addition to the prior 
restraint elements of registration requirements, proxy statement 
regulations also highlight the special treatment that corporate speech 
receives based on the corporate identity of the speaker. Proxy 
statements are communications to the shareholders regarding an 
upcoming shareholder vote, usually before annual meetings or special 
votes related to a merger, acquisition, or takeover.178  
Corporate speech in the form of proxy statements is regulated 
under a justification similar to that utilized for commercial speech. 
“The rationale for SEC regulation of the proxy materials is that proxy 
statements deal with commercial speech. Shareholders invest in the 
corporation. They can make intelligent decisions to hold or sell only 
if, inter alia, proxy regulation supplies them with truthful 
information.”179 Such communications, however, demonstrate the 
blurred lines between political speech and corporate commercial 
speech because proxy statements implicate the voting rights of the 
shareholders and because statements related to the election of 
corporate directors also evoke corporate policies. Even standard 
proxy issues related to endgame decisions about the future direction 
of the corporation (i.e., mergers and acquisitions) involve more than a 
pure discussion of the commodity (the stock); they evoke larger 
questions of corporate policy and have implications for all corporate 
stakeholders including management, shareholders, employees, and the 
community at large.180 In addition, filings may include a discussion 
about social responsibility, governance practices, or other issues that 
can be reflected or adopted in company policies that marry economic 
and political interests.181 For example, McDonalds Corporation 
                                                                                                                 
177 See Page, supra note 170, at 791 (describing how “numbers on a balance sheet” 
influence political speech of corporations). 
178 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 146, at 129 (“The thrust of the proxy system is 
the mandate of full disclosure in connection with shareholders’ meetings, and such meetings are 
the primary concern of state corporation law.”). 
179 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 282 (footnote omitted). 
180 See id. at 280–82 (describing the directors’ considerations when addressing proxy 
issues). Shareholder proxy statements can be excluded to the extent that they relate to “ordinary 
business operations.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). Shareholder proxy statements, however, 
may not be excluded if they are concentrated on “sufficiently significant social policy issues.” 
DIV. CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF LEGAL BULL. NO. 14A, SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS (2002), available at http://sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14a.htm (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
181 See Wolfson, supra note 85, at 285 (“Assume a corporation lobbies for a tax decrease 
on products. Full first amendment protection would appear to be granted. However, an internal 
dispute over the advisability of such a program, if brought to the point of a proxy contest for 
differing slates of directors, would be subject to the full range of proxy regulation.” ); see also 
DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UPDATE: 2009 PROXY 
SEASON REVIEW AND A LOOK AHEAD TO 2010 (2009), available at http://www.directorsforum. 
org/conference/materials/DF10%20%20Corporate%20Governance%20Update%202009%20Pro
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recently opposed a Humane Society shareholder proposal included in 
its proxy materials that would have required the company to purchase 
five percent of its eggs from suppliers who use cage-free housing 
systems instead of battery cages.182 
Corporate speech is subject to regulations based on the corporate 
identity of the speaker; formation charter requirements and state and 
federal registration requirements regarding the purchase and sale of 
stock are two examples. Corporate securities speech is regulated to 
protect investors from the distorting effect of the profit motivation 
behind such speech and to level the playing field among investors, 
even though such speech may often involve both economic and 
political elements. Citizens United answered the First Amendment 
question of how much protection to afford corporate political speech 
without considering this and other corporate law principles. 
Consequently, the Court incorrectly assumed that the law does not 
treat the speech of corporations differently from that of an individual.  
E. Equalization Rationale Argument 
The Supreme Court in Austin upheld restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditures for political speech based on the 
antidistortion rationale.183 Such restrictions were justified because of 
the corrosive and distorting effect of expenditures funded by the 
aggregations of wealth made possible only by the unique corporate 
form, and which may have no correlation to public support for the 
corporation’s political speech.184 Justice Kennedy pierced the 
antidistortion rationale in Citizens United with a two-pronged 
approach. First, Justice Kennedy highlighted that media corporations 
do not enjoy special protections under the First Amendment solely 
because of the phrase “free press.”185 Second, because § 441b 
                                                                                                                 
 
xy%20Season%20Review%20And%20a%20Look%20Ahead%20to%202010%20%20Mirvis%
201-10.pdf (summariing 2009 shareholder proposals).  
182 McDonald’s Corp. Sched. 14A, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/63908/000119312509081437/ddef14a.htm#toc45853_21 (last visited Jan. 
17, 2011); see also B.C. Upham, McDonald’s Opposes Shareholder Proposal for Cage Free 
Eggs in US, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/04/mcdonalds-
cage-free-eggs (describing the McDonald’s board’s recommendation). 
183 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
184 Id.  
185 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (“There is no precedent supporting laws that 
attempt to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media 
corporations and those which are not. ‘We have consistently rejected the proposition that the 
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.’” (quoting 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).  
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exempted media corporations, which also benefited from the ability to 
amass wealth due to the unique attributes of the corporate form, it 
demonstrated the insignificance of the threat of accumulation of 
wealth to fund political speech.186 For Justice Kennedy, the ability of 
some corporations to benefit from the corporate form and participate 
in the political sphere fatally weakened the antidistortion rationale. 
Additionally, due to the existence of parent corporations and media-
conglomerate corporations, Justice Kennedy argued, an exempted 
media corporation could become a mouthpiece for a sister company 
that would otherwise be prevented from participating in such political 
speech.187 
So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news 
organization has a right to speak when others do not, the 
exemption would allow a conglomerate that owns both a 
media business and an unrelated business to influence or 
control the media in order to advance its overall business 
interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an 
identical business interest but no media outlet in its 
ownership structure, would be forbidden to speak or inform 
the public about the same issue. This differential treatment 
cannot be squared with the First Amendment.188 
For Justice Kennedy, the resulting contest between small corporations 
and media conglomerates where media-related corporations have a 
voice and other corporations do not—or more accurately where they 
are restricted to speaking through PACs, outside of the independent 
expenditure time limits, or through indirect methods such as 
lobbying—created the untenable situation of differential treatment of 
speakers under the First Amendment.189  
In addition to analyzing the different treatment of media and 
nonmedia corporations, Justice Kennedy also rejected the 
antidistortion rationale on independent grounds, arguing that there 
will always be disparities in the volume or reach of the speech created 
based on the funding source—whether that be a wealthy individual or 
                                                                                                                 
186 Id. at 906 (“The law’s exception for media corporations is, on its own terms, all but an 
admission of the invalidity of the antidistortion rationale.”)  
187 Id. at 905 (“[M]edia corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the corporate 
form, the largest media corporations have ‘immense aggregations of wealth,’ and the views 
expressed by media corporations often ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support’ for 
those views.” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (majority opinion))).  
188 Id. at 906. 
189 See id. at 904–07 (describing the differential treatment of small corporations and media 
conglomerates). 
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a well-financed unincorporated business entity such as a 
partnership.190  
On one hand, the Court appeared to embrace an equalization 
argument as between media and nonmedia corporations, rejecting the 
law in part because of its media exception, which would create 
inequalities as between small corporations and media conglomerates. 
On the other hand, the Court referenced the inherent unequal playing 
field in any marketplace, especially the marketplace of ideas, as a 
reality of our economic and political system that was beyond the 
reach of the government to remedy.191 In overturning Austin, the 
Court returned to Buckley’s rejection of the equalization argument.192 
The equalization-of-voices argument that the Court brushed aside 
in Citizens United, however, is a foundational element of the 
securities regulations discussed above. For example, the regulation of 
proxy speech is a protectionist measure undertaken for the benefit of 
the small investor.193 The requirement that corporations disclose 
certain information before the exercise of corporate democracy rights 
compels speech of the corporation in order to make sure that the small 
shareholder is equally informed and as prepared to exercise her 
corporate-democracy rights as the large investor.  
Proxy regulation is designed to improve the corporate-
political leverage of the small shareholder. Yet, first 
amendment doctrine does not permit a kind of egalitarian 
                                                                                                                 
190 Justice Kennedy wrote that the political reality of corporate participation coupled with 
the independent-expenditure ban in § 441b created an asymmetry between the voice of smaller 
and nonprofit corporations who cannot engage in lobbying, etc., and those who can. Id. at 907.  
 
[T]he result is that smaller or nonprofit corporations cannot raise a voice to 
object when other corporations, including those with vast wealth, are cooperating 
with the Government. That cooperation may sometimes be voluntary, or it may be at 
the demand of a Government official who uses his or her authority, influence, and 
power to threaten corporations to support the Government’s policies. Those kinds of 
interactions are often unknown and unseen. The speech that § 441b forbids, though, 
is public, and all can judge its content and purpose.  
 
Id. 
191 See id. at 908 (“Even if § 441b’s expenditure ban were constitutional, wealthy 
corporations could still lobby elected officials, although smaller corporations may not have the 
resources to do so. And wealthy individuals and unincorporated associations can spend 
unlimited amounts on independent expenditures.” (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 
U.S. 449, 503–04 (2007))). 
192 Austin upheld the ban on expenditures because of “the corrosive and distorting effects 
of immense aggregations of wealth” in the marketplace of ideas. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
“Austin’s reasoning was—and remains—inconsistent with Buckley’s explicit repudiation of any 
government interest in ‘equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections.’” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 48–49 (1976)).  
193 Wolfson, supra note 85, at 283. 
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treatment of speech, including proxy speech, and the small 
shareholder has greater ability and opportunity to opt out of 
the corporation than [an] ordinary citizen has to opt out of the 
polity.194 
Dismissing the equalization and antidistortion rationales as beyond 
the proper scope of government intervention ignores a fundamental 
corporate law principle behind the disclosure and registration 
requirements in securities law. Once again, the Court’s assumptions 
regarding corporate political speech do not comport with the realities 
of corporate law, which are based, in part, on an equalization 
rationale.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis of corporate 
political speech rights in Citizens United was divorced from a 
corporate law perspective and thus rested on five flawed assumptions: 
(1) that the economic motivation of corporate speech, even corporate 
political speech, deserves no discount; (2) that there exists a singular 
corporate voice; (3) that the threat of compelled speech is 
insignificant; (4) that speech is not regulated based solely on the 
corporate identity of the speaker; and (5) that the equalization 
rationale is inapplicable to corporate speech. By examining the 
constitutional questions evoked in Citizens United through a 
corporate law lens, these assumptions are shown to be false and based 
on an inherently flawed conceptualization of corporations. The falsity 
of these assumptions calls into question the Court’s holding that 
corporate political speech cannot and should not be treated differently 
from individual political speech. The Court’s inconsistent 
conceptualization of corporations and application of First Amendment 
arguments to corporate political speech has created a doctrine that is 
subject to political and ideological undercurrents in a way that 
undermines the validity of the Court’s jurisprudence in this arena. In 
answering the difficult questions about the roles, rights, and 
responsibilities of corporate political speech in our democratic 
society, the analysis must be robust and must adhere to both First 
Amendment and corporate law principles. 
 
                                                                                                                 
194 Id. at 285 (footnote omitted). 
